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ABSTRACT 
Victory in irregular war and insurgency is not simply a matter of combat actions 
and civic aid; it is a matter of population mobilization. Winning the sympathy of the 
population will do little good for either the state or the insurgent if he fails to mobilize the 
population in a manner that allows him to reap the resources and legitimacy that either 
side needs to win. A winning strategy by the state must be one that either limits the 
insurgent’s ability to mobilize the population or allows the state to mobilize the 
population more efficiently than the insurgent. The use of social movement organizations 
offers an effective method for insurgents to mobilize a population during an insurgency. 
In many cases, the use of social movement organizations is more efficient as a 
mobilization strategy than are other strategies such as coercion or persuasion. A strategy 
by the state that disrupts the insurgent’s ability to use a sympathetic social movement 
organization offers the state an effective means to limit the resources available to the 
insurgents. In these cases, the state can also create its own social movement organizations 
to allow it to mobilize the population effectively in support of the government. 
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The world is currently faced with a variety of insurgencies, civil wars, separatist 
movements, fragmenting states, and other violent non-state challenges to existing states. 
The number of these internal wars has steadily increased since the end of World War II.1 
This trend has become extremely important to the United States and its allies with the rise 
of globalization and the inter-conductivity of the global economy. Conflicts around the 
world can rapidly impact citizens in the west.2 This conflict or “irregular war” presents a 
challenge that the U.S. has had difficulty coming to terms with as many experts believe it 
exemplifies the kind of conflict the U.S. is facing for the foreseeable future.3  
Irregular war, as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 
3000.07, is “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations(s).”4 In an irregular war, the state has lost its 
monopoly on violence5 and on the governance of its population.6 This “war amongst the 
people”7 is a struggle by both state and non-state actors to employ strategies that gain 
influence and control over the “relevant population(s);” thus, the key question in an 
                                                 
1 J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2008 (Boulder: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2007). 
2 The argument that the world is more connected, and thus, more susceptible to the effects of internal 
conflict and irregular war is most notably presented by Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On 
War in the 21st Century (Osceola: Zenith Press, 2006); John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of 
Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Hoboken: Wiley, 2008); Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the 
Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000). 
3 Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. to Raise 'Irregular War' Capabilities,” The Washington Post, December 4, 
2008. 
4 Department of Defense, Directive, DoD Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare (IW) (Washington, 
D.C.: DoD USD(P), 2008). 
5 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 192. 
6 Sir Frank Kitson describes how insurgents displace the influence of the state over the population 
either through subversion of the state-population relationship or through the application of force. Frank 
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping (St. Petersburg: Hailer 
Publishing, 1974), 32. 
7 Paraphrasing General Rupert Smith. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (New York: Knopf, 2007), 
280. 
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irregular war is ‘how does one gain influence and control over a population?’8 Gaining 
control and influence over the imponderable mass of a population, whether in one’s own 
country or to aid an ally, may seem a Sisyphean task;9 one in which small gains are 
quickly destroyed through the shifting attitudes of the population. Day after day, the state 
seeks to wrest control of the population from the insurgent, balancing protecting the 
population without engaging in excessive repression.10 
Insurgency, one form of irregular warfare, has inspired strategists to create 
methods for influencing a population from a soft “hearts and minds” strategy11 to a more 
coercive strategy based on force and the threat of violence.12 The U.S. Army’s recent 
counterinsurgency doctrine has recognized the central role the population plays in an 
insurgency, “At its core, COIN (counter-insurgency) is a struggle for the population’s 
support.”13 Furthermore, they have discovered what Mao, McCuen, Thompson, and 
                                                 
8 “The battlefield in COIN is in the people’s minds” and “irregular wars are won or lost in the minds of 
the local people. If we do not understand what is in those minds, what they value and how much they value 
it, success secured against terrorists and other insurgents will most likely be only temporary.” Colin S. 
Gray, Irregular Enemines and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 22, 25. 
9 A task that is pointless and unrewarding–http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sisyphus. 
10 “The abuses brought about by “search-and-destroy” operations by the military against the Muslim 
secessionists contributed to the collective outcry of the Moro people to rise in arms against the 
government.” SOT Center, AFP, FM 3-5-2 SALA'AM Manual (Quezon City: SOT Center, Armed Forces of 
the Philippines). 
11 The term “hearts and minds” is generally credited to Sir Gerald Templer, the British High 
Commissioner during the insurgency in Malaya from 1948-1960. Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in 
Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004). 
Although Templer did not use the phrase to describe a purely pursuasive startegy, the term has come to 
represent a “gratitude” strategy which uses nice behavior and “gifts” in the form of civic action projects to 
encourage the population to feel gratitude. Seeking gratitude as a strategy is rarely successful as it does 
little to alter the population’s exsisting loyalities and it is easily overcome by enemy coercion. The use of 
persuasion as a mobilization method will be explored in Chapter III.  
12 Several phrases are often used to exemplify the coercive strategy such as “if you have them by the 
balls then their hearts and minds will follow.” The phrase is attributed to a member of Congress during a 
discussion about the war in Vietnam in response to the “hearts and minds” strategy. Ralph Keyes, The 
Quote Verifier: Who Said Waht, Where, and When (New York: St. Martins Press, 2006). Another phrase 
used during the first years of the Iraq war is “I did not come here to hand out bread I came here to hand out 
lead!” Coercion as a mobilization method will be addressed in Chapter III. 
13 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2006), Chapter I, 28. 
 3
Galula14 already knew–that control and influence go to the organization that can best 
mobilize the population.15 Simple popular sympathy or fear does little to forward the 
cause of the insurgent or the state.16 Sympathetic but dormant people watch passively as 
one side slaughters the other or as one group slowly disintegrates from lack of resources 
and recruits. Mobilization of the population offers access to resources, potential political 
pressure, and means to gain legitimacy. More critical than how to win over the population 
is how to mobilize the population. In an internal war,17 whichever side can mobilize the 
population most efficiently is most likely to be victorious. According to FM 3-24, “The 
primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control 
and legitimacy.”18 Whether the method is through coercion, persuasion, or some other 
method, the goal is to mobilize the population better than the opponent.19 
A. CONCEPTS 
In the study of insurgencies, the role of the population is usually cited as the 
essential component for victory for either side.20 The phrase “the population is the center 
                                                 
14 Much of the U.S. Army’s current counterinsurgency doctrine as expressed in Field Manual 3-24 is 
based on the work of theses authors. Specific points of these books are referenced as the thesis progresses, 
but in general, the classics are Tse-tung Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare (Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press, 1961); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping (St. 
Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 1974); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice 
(New York: Praeger, 1964); John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Mechanicsburg: 
Stackpole Books, 1966); Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (Westport: Praeger 
Publishers, 1966). 
15 Tse-Tung Mao, On Protracted War (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1967), 60. 
16 David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Seminar 07,” Briefing, Small Wars Center of Excellence, 
September 26, 2007, http://babylonscovertwar.com/Analysis/COIN-
Kilcullen%20Small%20Wars%20Center%20of%20Excelence%20Semainar.pdf, slides 19, 54 and 67. 
17 Internal war is used by FM3-24 to describe certain conflicts that fall into the irregular war category 
such as insurgency, civil war and separatist conflicts. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 
Counterinsurgency. 
18 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Chapter 1, 8. 
19 The U.S. Army identifies five mobilization means–persuasion, coercion, reaction to abuses, foreign 
support and apolitical motivations. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 
Chapter I, 8. This thesis will explore the utility of social movement organizations as an additional 
mobilization means. 
20 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 8. 
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of gravity” is used often but it is difficult to translate into operational application.21 Thus, 
the counterinsurgent seldom takes full advantage of the potentially crucial role of the 
population in defeating an insurgency even though the underlying principle is well-
known.  
While analyzing/researching how the state or the insurgent mobilizes the 
population to gain victory, the authors noticed a potential trend: many successful 
insurgencies have utilized social movement organizations to organize and mobilize a 
population.22 In many cases, the military component of an insurgency is physically 
separate from population centers but still manages to maintain a strong connection to the 
population. If an insurgent needs to draw upon the population for resources, information, 
and recruits,23 what is he doing to gain control or influence of the population? In other 
words, how does an insurgent mobilize a population to support the insurgency? This 
thesis examines whether the use of social movement organizations offer insurgencies a 
relatively more efficient method of population mobilization. In many classic 
insurgencies, the insurgents created a social movement organization to fill the political 
space between armed insurgent member and the civilian population. From the peasants 





                                                 
21 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, xii, and reinforced through authors’ 
experience. In one author’s experience, a “hearts and minds” population-centric strategy relied heavily on 
hunting high value targets HVT or wanted terrorist leaders. The logic being that the people’s hearts and 
minds would change once the insurgent leaders were eliminated. 
22 This trend was first observed by the authors during deployments in Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East and reinforced during the study of insurgencies at NPS. Organizations such as the Communist New 
People’s Army NPA in the Philippines appear to gain substantial benefit through their association with a 
variety of sympathetic social movement organizations. 
23 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Chapter I, 28; Mao, On Protracted 
War, 60, 105. 
24 Tse-tung Mao, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), 34-35. 
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the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam25 to the current social organizations 
supporting Hezbollah in Palestine26 and the Mahdi Army in Iraq,27 social movements 
organizations have been instrumental in mobilizing the population. 
The subtle but substantial difference between a strategy based on “population is 
the key to victory” and “mobilization of the population is the key to victory” is important 
to note. The recognition that the insurgent or the counterinsurgent must mobilize a 
portion of the population provides a more easily understood idea/principle/concept with 
which to craft a strategy.28 Knowing the methods used by an insurgent to mobilize the 
population can be used by the counterinsurgent to create more appropriate tactics to fight 
with. Trying to understand how an insurgent “wins” the population is so vague, it is 
almost without value. It is more practical to analyze how an insurgent mobilizes the 
population. This can be accomplished through understanding the environment and good 
intelligence.  
Systematic intimidation, co-optation of traditional leaders or organizations, and 
exploitation of social movements are all methods the insurgent uses to mobilize a 
population continually and can be countered by the counterinsurgent through the creation 
of town councils, village defense teams, and farmers’ cooperatives. The distinction 
between the insurgent’s methods and the counterinsurgent’s methods is important and is 
explored in depth.  
Given the observation noted earlier that many insurgencies, which exploited 
social movement organizations had been successful leads to the fundamental question: 
Does the creation or co-optation of social movement organizations offer insurgent 
organizations a relatively efficient method to mobilize the population? If this is true, then 
                                                 
25 Nguyen Van Thieu, “Our Strategy for Guerilla War,” in Guerilla Strategies: An Historical 
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1982), 310-316; specifically the various worker coopeartives that were part of the NLF. 
26 Asef Bayat, “Social Movements, Activism, and Social Development in the Middle East,” United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (November 3, 2000): 15. 
27 Anthony Cordesman and Jose Ramos, “Sadr and the Mahdi Army: Evolution, Capabilities, and a 
New Direction,” in the Google Scholar database, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 4, 
2008, 3. 
28 According to FM 3-24, “The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle 
for political control and legitimacy.” Thus, mobilization of the population not simply winning their 
affection is the true objective. The concept of mobilization will be expanded upon in Chapter II. 
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it presents a second question: Can the state use the fact that insurgencies gain a relative 
advantage through their use of social movement organizations as a point of weakness and 
thus target the social movement organization as a method of weakening the insurgency?  
Mao points out that a movement is required to mobilize and sustain the masses, 
“if the masses alone are active without a strong leading group to organize their activity 
properly, such activity cannot be sustained for long or carried forward in the right 
direction, or raised to a higher level.”29 Essential to this analysis is the concept of relative 
efficiency in mobilization. The insurgent need not always select the most efficient 
method to mobilize the population, merely a method that provides him greater 
mobilization utility than his opponent. If the insurgent selects the most efficient 
mobilization available to him and if done using social movement organizations, then by 
taking this option away from the insurgents, the state can force the insurgency into a 
more expensive, less efficient method of mobilization. The side with a more efficient 
method can mobilize a greater number of the population, thus reaping more resources. To 
follow this analysis further, if the state can limit the insurgency’s ability to use the social 
movement organizations to mobilization and simultaneously empower their own social 
movement organizations, then the state can potentially de-mobilize and then counter 
mobilize the population.  
In cases where insurgents use a social movement organization, it is most probably 
because the insurgents believe that these movements are the most efficient means 
available to mobilize the population. The authors are assuming that an insurgency is 
acting rationally and selecting the most efficient method based on its understanding of the 
environment and its available resources. If a nascent insurgency selected an inefficient 
method of mobilizing the population, then logically it would not be able to grow and 
would quickly be defeated. In cases where insurgencies use social movement 
organizations to mobilize the population, an effective strategy for the state is to 
demobilize the social movement organization; thereby, isolating the insurgency and 
limiting the insurgency’s ability to gain needed resources from the population, and thus, 
                                                 
29 Mostafa Rejai, On Revolution and War: Mao Tse-tung 1893-1976 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 
349. 
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leading to its collapse. To determine what such a strategy entails, it is essential to seek a 
framework and tools to analyze a social movement organization. Fortunately, these exist 
in the form of modern social movement theory propagated by scholars such as Douglas 
McAdam and Charles Tilly. The authors hypothesize that the state can use social 
movement theory to better analyze and eventually demobilize an insurgency’s 
sympathetic social movement; thereby, leading to the defeat of the insurgency.  
B. DEFINITIONS  
It is helpful to define some of the common terms used to state the argument. 
Insurgency can have a variety of definitions, but in this thesis, the definition used is from 
the U.S. Army’s new counterinsurgency field manual (FM) titled Counterinsurgency FM 
3-24 and based on the Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Publication 1-02.30 Insurgency 
is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government using 
subversion and armed conflict. Internal war is a concept mentioned frequently in the U.S. 
Army’s new Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) 3-24, but without a definition.31 
Internal war as used by FM 3-24 is a broad concept that includes wars between 
competing indigenous groups within a country. This concept includes the possibility of 
external influences, but the main protagonists are indigenous. FM 3-24 also postulates 
that internal war, which includes insurgency, civil war, and separatist movements, is a 
struggle to mobilize the population. A social movement is a rational attempt by excluded 
groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through 
non-institutional means.32 Thus, social movement organization are a subset of social 
movements with a more formalized organizational structure and created to allow the 
direct participation of constituents with consensus built around common goals, which are 
usually oriented on making claims against the authorities.33  
                                                 
30 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 1-1. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 37. 
33 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 136. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The historical success of insurgencies using social movement organizations as 
well as the number of modern insurgencies that have a relationship with sympathetic 
social movement organizations led the authors to inquire–are these insurgencies gaining a 
comparative advantage in their mobilization competition against the state through the use 
of these social movement organizations? To examine this phenomenon, this thesis will 
first explore the insurgency environment to determine what role the population plays in 
an insurgency, why mobilization competition is important, and what elements of the 
environment an insurgency desires to alter to give it a better chance of success. Since the 
concept of mobilization and social movement organizations are elements of social 
movement theory, this thesis will next use social movement theory as a tool to analyze 
what a social movement organization does and how it may assist in mobilization of the 
population. Finally, this thesis will examine four case studies in which social movement 
organizations played an important role in the course of an insurgency in order to examine 
whether these social movement organizations provided the insurgency with any real 
benefits.  
1. Insurgency Environment 
First, the current counter insurgency (COIN) theory is explored. Most COIN 
theorists agree that the role of the population is critical in a counterinsurgency; however, 
in this thesis, classic and modern COIN theory is used to examine and help define exactly 
what role the population plays in an insurgency and what kind of influence is really 
required by the state or the insurgent to harness the power of the people. What does it 
mean to mobilize a population and what ways have successful and unsuccessful 
insurgents used in the past? In addition, COIN theory is used as a lens to help understand 
the form of an insurgency. Why does the insurgency need popular support and how does 
it transform popular support into power that defeats the state? In the end, the authors 
confirm three assumptions that helped develop their hypotheses. These assumptions are 
as follows. 
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• An insurgency is a political and social struggle. It can be thought of as a 
competition fought through the population to gain social and political 
space. 
• Mobilization is the tool that allows competitors in this struggle to gain 
social and political space.  
• Mobilization of the population is a continuous and tailorable process that 
may be accomplished by a variety of methods. The competition for 
political and social space generally goes to the competitors that best or 
most efficiently mobilize the population. 
2. Social Movement Theory 
Modern social movement theory (SMT) is examined to determine its usefulness to 
understanding social movement organizations. This examination seeks two outcomes: 
first, how can social movement theory be used to understand what role a social 
movement organization would play in a relationship with an insurgency, and, second, 
how can the tools of social movement theory be utilized to develop a method to 
demobilize the participants of the social movement organization. Although every social 
movement organization is different, some general principles are gained to develop a 
demobilization strategy.  
3.  Hypotheses 
The combination of the examination of the insurgent environment and the use of 
social movement theory to explore the role that social movement organization play in 
popular mobilization will assist in examining two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is: Use 
of social movement organizations by insurgencies as a tool for popular mobilization in 
general offers the insurgency a relatively efficient method to mobilize the population. If 
this hypothesis is true then a second hypothesis becomes apparent: If an insurgency used 
a social movement organization as a tool to mobilization a population, then the state can 
employ strategies that limit the effectiveness of the social movement organizations, 
which would thus limit the insurgency’s ability to mobilize the population. The 
insurgency would lose ability to mobilize or be forced to use a less efficient method of  
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mobilization. In order to examine the veracity, and thereby the utility, of these two 
hypotheses, this thesis will examine four case studies in which social movement 
organizations played an important role in the evolution of an insurgency. 
4. Case Studies 
The elements of social movement theory are then applied to analyze four case 
studies in which social movement organizations have played an active role in an 
insurgency. The connection between the social movement organization and the 
insurgency is demonstrated and the effects of state actions on the social movement 
organization on the insurgency are examined. It also shows that in cases where the state 
took action to demobilize the social movements, this had second order effects that 
damaged the insurgency, and conversely, when the state failed to address the social 
movement organization, the insurgency prospered. 
These cases have been selected for their homogeneity in independent variables, as 
each is fairly comparable in terms of extraneous variables, and for maximum variation on 
the dependent variable. The case of the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java, Indonesian 
from 1948 to 1962 was chosen because it offered an example of an insurgency that 
developed a strong relationship to a social movement organization and one in which the 
government eventually targets the social movement organization with much success. The 
current Jemaah Islamiyah movement offered a case in which the government has yet to 
target the social movement and the insurgency persists. By looking at the Ba’athist 
overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, a state’s failure to demobilize a movement is seen and 
more prudent actions the state might have taken are examined. Finally, in the analysis of 
the Sunni insurgency, a partially successful demobilization is shown. The authors look at 
what the state has done to disband the movement and what future actions the state might 
take to demobilize the Sunni insurgency further. 
The thesis concludes by connecting the theoretical and empirical analysis to 
develop a strategy to demobilize a social movement organization and make specific 
policy recommendations. The authors provide the counterinsurgent tools to both 
demobilize and counter-mobilize a population. 
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II. INSURGENCY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The two hypotheses, in proof of which the authors seek to explore the relative 
efficiency social movement organizations can provide to insurgencies and the utility that 
the state can gain through demobilizing social movement organizations as a method to 
diminish the insurgency, first requires an attempt to describe the insurgency environment 
and its characteristics. This chapter examines the insurgency environment and attempts to 
quantify what the insurgent and the state are attempting, as well as what provides each 
side an advantage and what leads to victory. 
1. An Insurgency 
Insurgency, as described by the U.S. DoD, is an organized movement aimed at the 
overthrow of a constituted government using subversion and armed conflict.34 All sides35 
in an insurgency seek to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population while diminishing 
the perceived legitimacy of the opposing side.36 An insurgency movement generally 
consists of a core of leaders supported by intermediate leaders that comprise the political 
cadre and military leadership. The balance of the movement consists of a matrix of 
supports and auxiliaries.37 The movement then must work to enhance its own legitimacy 
and ability to influence and control the population while simultaneously working to 
                                                 
34 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001), 268. 
35 An insurgency is not limited to only one challenger at a time. There are frequently a variety of 
insurgencies at once. Although this thesis and many of the references refer to the insurgent state interaction, 
this does not presuppose that there is only one insurgency in the environment. David Kilcullen calls the 
environment a conflict eco-system and it includes a variety of insurgents, criminals and other challengers to 
state influence. The population is a complicated environment composed of ethnic groups, tribes, villages, 
neighborhoods, towns, cities, temporary alliances, key influential communications and formal and informal 
leaders. The environment that Dr. David Kilcullen refers to as the “conflict ecosystem” requires intensive 
analysis but for the purposes of this thesis, it is referred to as the population or the civil terrain. 
36 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2006), cp 1, 2-3. 
37 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, cp 1, 11. 
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diminish the states legitimacy and ability to control and influence the population.38 A 
prominent French counterinsurgency expert during the 1950s and 1960s and author that 
heavily influenced the U.S. Army’s current counterinsurgency doctrine is David Galula. 
He argues that for the insurgent to change the perception of legitimacy of the state in the 
minds of the population, the insurgent must have some mechanism to maintain contact 
with the population. The insurgents then must preserve a strong link to the population39 
with which they will attempt to leverage the population’s grievances and any weakness in 
the state.40 Through these links to the population, the insurgents work to diminish the 
state’s legitimacy. 
2. A Social/Political Struggle 
An insurgency conducts his competition for legitimacy through a struggle to gain 
control of social and political space.41 FM 3-24 further describes the insurgency 
environment as the struggle to gain political power: “Political power is the central issue 
in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its 
governance or authority as legitimate.”42 The political power that FM 3-24 refers to is 
gained through the control and influence of the socio/political space. The struggle then, 
as described by FM 3-24, is one not to gain or control physical terrain but to control 
political and social space. In the words of FM 3-24, it is, “an organized, protracted 
                                                 
38 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, cp 1, 7. 
39 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 49. 
40 Ibid., 42. 
41 Political space as defined by Nic Cheesman refers to the arena within which political actors engage 
in political activities in the absence of coercive pressure. These arenas can be both formal and informal and 
include influence on the formal and informal institutions that connect the population to governing bodies. 
Nicholas Cheeseman, “Introduction: Political Linkage and Political Space in the Era of Decolonization,” 
Africa Today (2006): 8; Kumar Ramakrishna defines political space as the level of sympathy or legitimacy 
a political actor can create from his/herself. Kumar Ramakrishna, “Countering Radical Islam in Southeast 
Asia,” in Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional 
Stability, ed. Paul J. Smith (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 2005), 153. Taken together, this offers a 
definition for political space as the level of legitimacy and influence that a political actor creates for him or 
her to participate in the political dialog and the process of decision making of a state or within a population. 
This legitimacy thus offers the political actor some level of freedom from repression. Social space is 
similar as it is based on a level of legitimacy and influence an actor has created for him or her to participate 
in a social dialogue and within the matrix of relationships that define how individuals and groups relate to 
each other. 
42 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency. 
 13
politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established 
government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent 
control.”43  
Galula casts insurgency as “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by 
step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of 
the existing order.”44 The intermediate objectives he highlights are the accumulation of 
control or influence of the socio/political space, which supports the growth of the 
insurgency and the decrease of the state’s control. As an example, the simple discussion 
of the perceived grievances of the population may offer the insurgent greater political 
space. If the state is unwilling or unable to address the grievances, it may be 
understandably reluctant to discuss the matter. That vacated role, which the insurgency 
fills in by encouraging the voicing of the grievances of the population, allows it to 
displace some of the state’s political and social space.45 
One of the most famous insurgency strategists is Mao Tse-Tung, the Chinese 
guerrilla leader who fought the Chinese nationalist government and the Japanese 
occupying army through most of the first half of the 20th century and eventually defeated 
both to became premier of China. Mao saw insurgency as a political competition in 
which violence was sometimes necessary if it supported a political objective. Violence or 
military activities without a political objective were useless or counterproductive.46 
Political activities are the reason the insurgency movement exists.47 These definitions 
taken together provide a picture of an insurgency as a protracted struggle to gain control 
of a social space through violent political competition. 
                                                 
43 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, cp 1, 1. 
44 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 4. 
45 Ibid., 18-24. 
46 Although the use of violence is a defining characteristic of an insurgency, it does not limit the 
insurgency from using non-violent methods as well. In fact, Mao argues that military action and violence 
should only be used when the action has a direct impact on the socio/political space. 
47 Tse-tung Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 88-89. 
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B. THE ROLE OF THE POPULATION (BROTHER CAN YOU SPARE A 
DIME–AND YOUR OLDEST MALE CHILD?) 
This description of the insurgent struggle indicates that the population is the focus 
of the struggle and this argument is supported by a variety of insurgency theoreticians. 
The population is the objective of the struggle.48 Mao argues, “Because guerilla warfare 
basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor 
flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.”49 Mao continues to 
argue, “Without question, the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the 
people”50 and that “weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it 
is people, not things, which are decisive.”51 In his most famous quote, Mao states that, 
“[T]he guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.”52 Galula 
supports Mao’s argument when he writes that the objective of insurgency is the 
population.53 He further highlights the population’s importance in saying that it is the 
very terrain in which the conflict must be fought.54 If the population is the goal, then why 
is the population the goal? What role does the population play in an insurgency? The 
population is important because it plays two critical roles for whichever side gains 
legitimacy and influence. These are the role of resource and the role of “cogs in the state 
system.” 
                                                 
48 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 6. 
49 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 44. 
50 Ibid., 73. 
51 Mao, On Protracted War, 44. 
52 Ibid., 93. 
53 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 7. 
54 Ibid., 7-9. 
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1. Source of Resources (Who Brings the Popcorn to the Guerrilla 
Theater?)55 
Insurgencies generally start with limited resources and only a few committed 
members. The insurgency then must find a method to expand its organization to 
challenge the state and convince the people they are capable of resisting and eventually 
defeating the state and gain their support in doing so.56 The population plays a 
“defensive” role, when it supplies the insurgency with resources such as money, 
weapons, recruits, food, and other needed resources such as intelligence. The population 
also contributes to maintaining the security of the young insurgency, either by limiting 
the information the state receives about the insurgency or by providing safe locations for 
the insurgent or both. Mao states that, in his opinion, the first condition that must be 
satisfied to make the insurgency situation favorable is that “the people give active support 
to the Red Army.”57,58 In Mao’s protracted war, the population provided the resources 
with which he and his fellow rebels could defeat a stronger, better equipped, and richer 
opponent. Mao’s protracted war would allow his small guerrilla group to grow into a 
force capable of defeating their stronger opponents, and while he was growing stronger, 
his opponents would become weaker and weaker through exhaustion and inefficiency.59 
2.  People Power 
The second role, as Mao and Galula agree, is the most valuable: that of securing 
socio/political power. Galula argues that “politics becomes an active instrument of  
 
 
                                                 
55 Guerrilla Theater is a tactic developed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as a method to 
dramatize the “evils” of the insurgents in specific villages. SOT Center, AFP, FM 3-5-2 SALA'AM Manual 
(Quezon City: SOT Center, Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP n.d.), 92. 
56 “The insurgent thus has to grow in the course of the war from small to large, from weakness to 
strength, or else he fails.” Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 7. 
57 The Chinese communist’s military wing during their insurgency against the Japanese and the 
Chinese nationalists. 
58 Mao, Selected Works, 215. 
59 Mao, On Protracted War, 30. 
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operation” meaning that the operation or the tool to defeat one’s opponent is found in the 
population.60 Mao also sees in the population the tools for the state’s exhaustion and 
eventual defeat.61 
This role could be viewed in terms of the population’s offensive or proactive role 
when it is mobilized to slow or stop parts of the state’s system, or create pressure on the 
state. Farmers producing fewer crops for the state or bus drivers failing to meet schedules 
or soldiers failing to participate in the fighting are all cogs that when broken, slow down 
the system and damage the state. 
McAdam supports Mao’s and Galula’s argument about the potential political 
power of the people. He argues that the people comprise the system upon which the state 
gains its power. In other words, the people are the “cogs” that run the system. Even if 
they have limited power as an individual, they have real power as a collective; so the 
people, while running the system, have the seeds of the system’s destruction.62 
As organized challengers to the state appear successful in the eyes of the 
population, this encourages other individuals to test the state’s limits. As Sidney Tarrow 
points out, “Ordinary people begin to test the limits of social control.”63 This action in 
itself can widen the political opportunities available to the insurgent’s movement as it 
“unhinges old [state] institutions.” Instability and confusion may arise as “disruption 
obstructs the routine activities of opponents, bystanders or authorities and force them to 
attend to the protesters.”64  
To engage the population in either or both of these two roles, mobilization of the 
population is then required. 
                                                 
60 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 9. 
61 Mostafa Rejai, On Revolution and War: Mao Tse-tung 1893-1976 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 
250. 
62 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 36-38.  
63 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24-25 
64 Ibid., 24. 
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C. MOBILIZATION, NOT JUST HEARTS AND MINDS (“MY PEOPLE 
LOVE ME AND THAT’S ALL THAT MATTERS” VS. “GET OFF THE 
COUCH AND ON TO THE STREETS”) 
Both Mao and Galula agree that the population is the goal and the terrain of the 
conflict and that the population represents a source of resources as well as a weapon with 
which to defeat the state. In addition, they both agree on one more point. It is the 
mobilization of the population that empowers the insurgent, not just gaining its sympathy. 
The entire Chinese population may have been sympathetic to Mao’s rebels but until he 
was able to mobilize it, it was useless to the struggle. McAdam et al., present the problem 
like this, “Under what conditions will” the people become mobilized.65 
Mao’s says, “The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will 
create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for 
our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming 
difficulty in the war.” Mao sees the mobilization of the people as the key to victory. He 
continues to say, “To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like 
wishing to go south by driving the chariot north, and the result would inevitably be to 
forfeit victory.”66 Galula sees the other side of the struggle when he articulates that the 
problem of the counterinsurgent is to “find the favorable minority, to organize it in order 
to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority.”67 FM 3-24 recognizes this as 
it states, “The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for 
political control and legitimacy. Insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to mobilize 
popular support for their cause.”68 
Mobilization is defined by The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology as “The process 
by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active 
                                                 
65 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, September 10, 2001), 38. 
66 Mao, On Protracted War, 60. 
67 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 77. 
68 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 1-8. 
 18
participant in public life (demobilization is thus the reverse process).”69 In addition to 
mobilization and demobilization, there is also counter-mobilization. The Oxford 
Dictionary of Sociology does not define counter-mobilization but it does define counter-
movement as an “organized response to a social movement, with the purpose of blocking 
the movement’s activities, resisting change, and presenting alternative points of view.”70 
This definition is used as a basis to create a unique definition for this thesis for counter-
mobilization, which is the process a group goes through when its political mobilization is 
realigned. It may be helpful to think of this from the point of view of the insurgency: 
whereas demobilization is a neutral position, mobilization is a positive position and 
counter-mobilization is a negative position actively moving away from the insurgency 
and closer to the state (or vice versa if looking at the definitions from the state’s point of 
view). 
To frame the conflict in terms of mobilization as opposed to gaining sympathy or 
winning hearts and minds provides a more useful measure of effectiveness with which to 
determine the true effects of insurgent and state actions. One might gain the sympathy of 
a segment of the population but without effective mobilization, it may be of little use. 
Conversely, one might mobilize unsympathetic portions of a population through coercion 
or social pressure and these unsympathetic but mobilized individuals may be quite 
helpful to the mobilizing organization.71 
D. ELEMENTS OF MOBILIZATION (OR HOW TO MOBILIZE) (SADDLE 
UP FREE RIDER) 
At this point, it would be helpful to examine several brief examples of successful 
and unsuccessful socio/political mobilization in support of insurgencies.  
                                                 
69 John Scott, and Gordon Marshall, Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 420. 
70 Ibid., 120. 
71 One interesting example is from Karl Jackson’s study of the Darul Islam insurgency in Indonesia in 
the 1950s. Jackson argues that the mobilization of insurgency supporters was primarily a function of 
whether a village leader supported the insurgency. If he did then social pressure mobilized the entire village 
to support DI whether the individuals were sympathetic to the insurgency or not. See Karl D. Jackson, 
Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1980). 
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1. National Liberation Front (NLF)  
Nguyen Van Thieu was a member of the National Liberation Front’s (NLF) 
central committee working to overthrow first the French colonial government and later 
the South Vietnamese government. Thieu explains their strategy in his article Our 
Strategy for Guerrilla War. He sees the population as the key to victory, 
“[R]evolutionary war is the people’s war. In other words, the role played by the 
population is not just important: it is fundamental.”72 Having clarified that the people are 
the focus of the struggle, Thieu continues to explain that the NLF process is to establish 
and maintain daily contact between the population and the cadre of the NLF. Thieu sees 
the best way to mobilize the population is to maintain continuous contacts with 
individuals as much as possible. Through these contacts, the NLF examines and develops 
the grievance and discontent of the peasants, “then their discontent can be elevated into 
positive hatred of the regime, and then they will join the struggle for a better life.”73 
According to Thieu, to mobilize the population, the NLF must establish their position 
inside a village to maintain the required constant contact and they must study the village 
and develop a deep understanding of the villager’s social structure and their needs and 
goals.  
In Thieu’s description of the NLF insurgency strategy, he focuses on the process 
of daily interaction between the cadre of the NLF and the population of the cadre’s 
assigned village. Thieu clearly saw the continuous one on one grassroots contact as the 
best way for the NLF to mobilize the population. In his concept, the NLF can create a 
self-sustaining relationship through the creation of a village organization in which the 
political cadre provides support to individuals in the village and the villagers provide 
needed support to the cadre. When successful, this type of organizational relationship can 
                                                 
72 Nguyen Van Thieu, “Our Strategy for Guerilla War,” in Guerilla Strategies: An Historical 
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1982), 310-316. 
73 Ibid., 311. 
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create more resources than it consumes by harnessing the power of collective action and 
overcoming the free rider problem through collective pressure on individual members.74  
Frances FitzGerald describes the NLF activities in her book Fire in the Lake as a 
process of slow integration as the NLF cadre develops a relationship with individuals in a 
community and evaluates potential grievances with which to build an organization 
element to address those grievances. Once the NLF cadre had determined the appropriate 
grievances, it would build an organization by connecting these individual relationships 
and help the community develop an appropriate response to its grievances. Groups such 
as farmers’ organizations empower individual farmers through a “collective effort” in 
which farmers pool their resources and are then able to increase their outputs with the 
same amount of inputs.75 
2. Mao 
The NLF strategy was based on the works of Mao. During Mao’s struggle against 
the nationalist regime, he directs his insurgents to help local villagers form peasant 
associations. This is how Mao mobilized the population, first through creating local 
organizations and then helping them act collectively to address their grievances.76 One 
particular example is the peasants in China’s Hunan province, who were struggling under 
the harsh rule of the landlords and the corrupt government officials. Mao’s cadre helped 
the peasants use collective action to first diminish the landlord’s position in society. The 
peasants refused to offer the landlords the traditional symbols and gestures of 
subservience, thus expanding peasant control of social space, and then by collectively 
refusing to deliver material goods (agricultural products and labor) to the landlords and 
government representatives, the peasants’ group began to expand their political space.77  
                                                 
74 Thieu, “Our Strategy for Guerilla War.” 
75 Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), 155-182. 
76 Once organized and mobilized, the insurgents can move the peasants toward acting more and more 
in the insurgent’s interest. 
77 Mao, Selected Works, Volume I, 34-40. 
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3. Give the People a Ba’ath 
In Iraq, the National Unity Front, a social movement of sorts, motivated those 
who overthrew the Iraqi monarchy. The Front, an alliance of the Ba’athist party, the Iraqi 
Communist Party, and the National Democratic Party, were formed in opposition to the 
monarchy. This organization also did a successful job of providing voice to the 
disaffected Iraqi populace and mobilizing them in opposition to the monarchy.78 Across 
Iraq, labor strikes, work stoppages, and demonstrations erupted. This outpouring of 
public discontent provided the motivation to the Army officers who would topple the 
monarchy. 
4. New People’s Army (NPA) 
A fourth useful example is articulated in an article in Asian Survey in 1986. Jose 
Magno and A. James Gregor recorded the New People’s Army (NPA) insurgent activities 
in the Arakan Valley area on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. The NPA used a 
mobilization method based on an in-depth analysis of each village (called barangay in 
the Philippines) and then a process of individual contacts. The NPA system, which 
resembles the NLF method in the first example, focused on building individual 
relationships at low levels, the barangay, and ensured these relationships were 
continuous. The NPA would then form these villagers into a self-sustaining organization. 
The NPA’s methods were very successful and effectively turned the area into a NPA 
stronghold.79 
E. LOCAL FOCUS 
One might argue that insurgents, due to their deficiency of resources, insurgents 
are forced into operating only locally and cannot administer a broader “mass market” 
                                                 
78 Mesut Ozcan, “Political and Social Reasons for 1958 Revolution in Iraq,” Turkish Review of Middle 
East Studies 15 (Annual 2004), 342. 
79 Jose P. Magno, and A. James Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” Asian 
Survey (1986): 501-517. 
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attempt to mobilize the population. Whereas the state, with its plentiful resources, uses a 
“wholesale” method of mobilization, which takes less effort and appears more efficient.  
Wholesale mobilization overlooks the advice by Mao and Galula to study the 
individual needs of the population, which are different, based on the smaller social 
groups and the geographic environment, and tailor one’s mobilization efforts to the 
specific environment.80 In addition, many social scientists have examined the high degree 
of influence that one-on-one personal contacts have, as opposed to a broader but 
impersonal proselytizing method, on individual decision making.81 
In one brief example of the utility of local continuous methods even when used by 
the state is the previously cited NPA example in the Arakan Valley. Once the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) identified the NPAs effective methods, they copied them 
by forming barangay development and protection groups and expanding their relationship 
through individual contacts. They also committed their soldiers assigned to the area to 
stay for an extended period of time to ensure a continuous influence. This method was far 
more successful then the AFP’s previous attempts and within several years, the AFP 
successfully displaced the NPA’s influence in the Arakan valley.82 
1. Egypt 
However, successful insurgencies do not always use concomitant social 
movement organizations. Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and his Free Officer Movement 
successfully overthrew the Egyptian monarchy with little help from the quiescent 
Egyptian population. Nasser tried to mobilize the population,83 but the predominantly 
conservative Egyptians failed to respond. Now, it is possible to argue that whereas Nasser 
was unsuccessful in mobilizing the population for his cause, he was very effective in 
                                                 
80 Andrews documents the Viet Cong following Mao’s advice and deploying study teams to individual 
villages for analysis. William R. Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary 
Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964 (Univ. of Missouri, 1973), 42-50. 
81 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Back Bay 
Books, 2002). 
82 Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines.” 
83 Lawrence Cline, “Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies: A Comparison,” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 9, no. 2 (August 1998). 
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keeping the population from mobilizing in support of the monarchy. His anti-
imperialistic, nationalist policies and economic reform were well-received by the 
population and Nasser is still seen as a hero in Egypt and throughout the Arab world.84 
While unable to develop his own sympathetic social movement organization, Nasser was 
very effective at ensuring the state, and thereafter any would-be insurgent, would not be 
able to do so either. 
2. Algeria 
Similarly, in Algeria, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) did not make use of a 
social movement organization, turning against what were cooperative populations. In 
fact, Islamic fundamentalist candidates fared well in elections, winning the first round of 
parliamentary elections. These elections were overturned by the government, which was 
subsequently deposed in a military coup. GIA arose out of this conflict and began a 
campaign of indiscriminate violence. Between 1992 and 1998, GIA is estimated to have 
killed around 100,000 civilians.85  
As shall be seen in the subsequent chapter, this method of coercion of the 
population is the most inefficient strategy for the insurgent to pursue. GIA could arguably 
better pursue its aims through a social movement organization that leveraged the 
population’s proclivity for Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, perhaps this strategic 
mistake is best illustrated by the fact that almost 18 years after it started its campaign, 
GIA has been unsuccessful in its attempts to overthrow the Algerian government. 
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F. MANIPULATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
In the end, the insurgent seeks to manipulate his environment to give him an 
advantage to execute his political program.86 As discussed, the link to the population is 
essential to the insurgent for him to deliver his political program.87 The insurgent also 
needs a method to exploit government weaknesses, whether real or perceived, and if 
possible, to use these weaknesses to limit the state’s ability to repress the insurgency.88 
Finally, the insurgency wants to manipulate real or perceived grievances to exacerbate 
the lack of legitimacy of the state and allow the insurgents access to political space and 
legitimacy.89 
G.  RECONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM 
 The problem for either side that wishes to compete in this environment is–who to 
mobilize the population in a way that is better than my opponent? The insurgent might 
say” what can I do to either change my organization to enable me to mobilize better, 
damage my opponent so he mobilizes worse or alter the environment so I gain some 
comparative advantage? The insurgent is looking for the best available method to 
improve his ability to mobilize and diminish his opponent’s ability to mobilize.  
                                                 
86 Andrews gives an excellent example of the communist insurgents in South Vietnam altering village 
political dynamics to adjust the village environment to make it more conductive to the Viet Cong programs. 
Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 
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Tse-tung 1893-1976, 348-351. 
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fear of alienating political constituents,’ and misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict are all 
frequently cited weakness of the state. 
89 Galula highlights the insurgents desire to select grievance that the state will have difficulty to 
address. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 20-21. Jones in his book about the 
communist insurgency in the Philippines, highlight the role the insurgents–the New People’s Army NPA 
leverage grievance the state cannot or will not address to gain popularity and political legitimacy. Gregg R. 
Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989). 
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H.  CONCLUSION 
The insurgent struggle is one of attempting to control a political/social space 
through violent political competition. This socio-political struggle for control and 
influence of the population is expressed through a competition to mobilize one’s 
supporters more efficiently and to limit the ability of one’s opponents to mobilize his 
supporters. Although the mobilization of the population is the goal, a variety of methods 
exists to mobilize the population. Each method has advantages and disadvantages but 
successful mobilization tends to be continuous as most individual actions to mobilize lose 
their influence and dissipate in the mind of the population rapidly. In addition, most 
methods tend to be more effective when executed at the lowest (grassroots) level possible 
allowing for tailored implementation based on individual community’s circumstances, as 
well as allowing personal relationship to develop between the mobilizing group or 
individual and the mobilized population. 
This analysis of the insurgency’s environment indicates that for social movements 
to be of utility to insurgencies, it would have to mobilize the population effectively and 
generally focus on “grass roots” organization while providing continuous mobilizing 
influences. The next chapter explores this application. 
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III. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The exploration of insurgency has helped distill some concise descriptions about 
the insurgency environment. The first is that the true goal of the insurgent is the 
mobilization of the population as opposed to simply winning the affection of the 
population. The next element of the environment noted is that the process of mobilization 
is a continuous process as opposed to one that relies on singular events. The final element 
distilled from this analysis of the insurgent’s environment is that the continuous 
mobilization process is more effective when organized at a local level as opposed to a 
regional or national level.  
This helps create a model for the mobilization of the population with which it is 
possible to examine potential methods to be used to achieve the continuous local 
mobilization of the population. To be successful, the insurgent would have to use a 
mechanism that creates a locally based continuously mobilized population. This leads to 
the first hypothesis, that most successful insurgencies use a social movement organization 
to create that continuous local mobilization they need to grow and win.90 
The authors argue that an insurgency selects a social movement organization 
method because it is the most efficient method available to the insurgency to produce a 
local continuously mobilized population. This means that the elements of a social 
movement organization fit the requirements of the insurgency. Thus, it is beneficial at 
this point to explore what a social movement organization is and if it, as argued, satisfies 
the requirements created by the conclusions based on the exploration of the environment 
of insurgency.  
                                                 
90 As demonstrated in Chapter II, insurgencies need to grow to win. 
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B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
According to John Lofland’s Social Movement Organizations, a social movement 
organization is an “association of persons making idealistic and moralist claims about 
how human personal or group life ought be organized that, at the time of their claim-
making, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society…”91 McCarthy and Zald 
explain social movement organizations as a “complex, or formal organization which 
identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and 
attempts to implement those goals.”92 To describe a social movement organization 
further, Della Porta and Diani quote Kriesi in describing the internal structure of a social 
movement as having formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation and 
division of labor, and a system of horizontal and vertical integration.93 Social movement 
organizations are generally locally organized groups of individuals with an established 
cadre that works to support and expand the organization. The organization is focused on 
an issue or range of issues that they believe should be changed within their society. A 
social movement organization usually has an established organization structure, a 
professional cadre (meaning some elements of the leadership or support structure have 
committed to the organization on a full time basis as their job/career), and it usually has 
some type of overt identification. This is in contrast to an insurgency, which usually has a 
covert existence. This contrast highlights one benefit an insurgency can gain from their 
relationship with the social movement organization; its ability to communicate with and 
recruit from the public.  
To examine the hypothesis that social movement organizations are a more 
efficient method to create a local, continuous mobilization of the population, the authors 
explore some other potential methods of mobilization, persuasion and coercion.  
                                                 
91 John Lofland, Social Movement Organizations: Guide to Research on Insurgent Realities (New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 1996), 2-3. 
92 Donatella Della Porta, and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction. 2nd ed. (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 140. 
93 Ibid., 140. 
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C. PERSUASION  
Insurgents and counterinsurgents alike have long considered persuasion, the use 
of real or implied incentives to encourage an individual or a group to take certain 
desirable actions, a mobilization tool. Persuasion can avoid the animosity, which is 
common when coercion is used and may require fewer resources initially than does 
coercion. Many researchers argue that the population makes a rational decision to support 
whichever side can supply them the most benefits.94 Many counterinsurgency strategies 
involve actions to bolster the state’s legitimacy through the delivery of social services 
and improvements in the efficiency of governance as an attempt to persuade the 
population that the state can meet their needs better than the insurgency.95 Insurgents 
commonly have less access to material resources and use devices such as religious or 
political ideology, or highlight a popular grievance held by the population.96 The 
population’s belief that the insurgency can either alleviate this grievance, or align the 
country closer to the proper religious or political ideology may persuade them to support 
the insurgency.97 Ideology and grievances are important to mobilization but persuasion 
without some type of organizing structure such as a social movement organization will 
have limited utility.  
There are several challenges to the use of persuasion alone as a mobilization 
method. First, the terms of persuasion, the benefit that the population may receive, may 
not be understood or believed by the population. Obviously, if the population do not 
understand or believe the persuader (the insurgents or the government), then they will not 
change their behavior.  
The next challenge is the difficulty of tying potential benefits to desired actions. 
This is articulated in Rebellion and Authority. Leites and Wolf argue that increases to the 
resources available to an individual do not necessarily change their preferences. In fact, 
                                                 
94 David C. Gompert and John Gordon, War by Other Means (Final, Arlington: Rand Corporation, 
2008), 90-92. 
95 U.S. Army, Counterguerrilla Opeartions (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986). 
96 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 92. 
97 U.S. Army, Counterguerrilla Opeartions. 
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they argue that if the state uses improved social services as a method to persuade the 
population but fail to tie access to these social services to quantifiable action then the 
population’s actions may not change and they will simply have more resources available 
to support the insurgency.98 The same argument could be made for the insurgents, if they 
supply increased resources to the population without any corresponding mechanism to 
alter the population’s actions then there is no reason for the population’s preference to 
change. This makes persuasion alone an unreliable and inconsistence source of 
mobilization. 
Another challenge with the use of persuasion as the sole method of mobilization 
of the population is the problem of the “free-rider.”99 According to the Oxford Dictionary 
of Sociology a free-rider is “a person who takes advantage of a public good, or other 
collectively funded benefit, while avoiding any personal cost, or evading personal 
contributions to collective funding.”100 An individual may appreciate the effort of a 
group to increase his standard of living but he may see no reason to support the conflict 
actively because he feels others will take the risk and he will still receive the benefits. 
An example of the failure of a strategy based predominantly on persuasion can be 
seen in the communist insurgency in the Republic of the Philippines from 1945 to 1953. 
The insurgents called the Hukbalahap (contraction of Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon 
or National Anti-Japanese Army and later Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan or Army of 
National Libration, sometimes called HMB, or more simply Huk) emerged as a strong 
and well-organized guerilla movement during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. 
Once the Japanese Imperial Army withdrew from the Philippines, the Huks began to fight 
the newly formed independent government installed and supported by the United States. 
The Huks were well-organized and well-armed, and by 1950, the Philippine government 
in Manila was in fear for its very existence. The Huks based their movement on the 
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grievances of the peasants unsatisfied with rampant poverty, abuse and misrule by the 
absentee landlords that controlled the rural areas and the corruption and inattention of the 
national government. Although things looked extremely dim for the national government 
in 1950, by 1953, the tide had turned and the Huks were all but defeated. Much of the 
credit goes to Secretary of Defense, and later President, Ramon Magsaysay, but the 
strategy of the Huks also contributed to their own defeat.  
William Pomeroy, an American who supported the Huk movement and joined 
them in the jungles of the Philippines, kept a journal of their activities, which he later 
published.101 This journal provides insight into the attitudes and strategy of the Huks. In 
The Forest, Pomeroy saw that the “reserve” for both the government forces and the Huks 
were the “unenlightened, uncommitted masses of the people” and he saw that the key to 
the conflict was being able to persuade the masses that the Huks were right and the 
government was wrong. The Huks’ tools were “propaganda of word” and “propaganda of 
action.” By “explaining to the people” and by setting an example for the people to see 
they thought that they could expand the HMB. Pomeroy and the Huks seem to believe 
that propaganda and demonstrations of Huk power could mobilize the population to leave 
their villages and join the Huks. However, the Huks were unable to overcome the “free-
rider” problem and mobilize individuals to join the insurgency. President Magsaysay’s 
land reform programs and his reorganization of the military successfully diminished even 
the passive support for the Huks. The Huks were eventually defeated in 1953, never 
having persuaded the peasant population to mobilize and rise up against the 
government.102 Pomeroy puts it best when in July 1951 he writes, “we thought the people 
moved at our pace, to the rapid click of the mimeograph machine… we have been living 
in a fool’s paradise.”103 
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D. COERCION  
Coercion can, in the short term, be an effective tool of mobilization. As FM 3-24 
points out, “Insurgents may use coercive force to provide security for people or to 
intimidate them and the legitimate security forces into active or passive support.”104 
Coercion gives insurgents rapid supply opportunities, or in other words, they may take 
what they need when they need it (at least until their victims find a way to hide their 
valuables). There are several drawbacks to using coercion and many successful insurgent 
leaders sternly command their followers to avoid using coercion.105 Excessive coercion 
could potentially turn the population against the insurgency and destroy their possibility 
of popular support. James Scott argues that the very act of coercion creates an underlying 
attitude in the people subject to it and that they will seek out opportunities to resist the 
will of the coercing power. He states, “forced compliance not only fails to produce 
attitudes that would sustain that compliance in the absence of domination, but produces a 
reaction against such attitudes” (emphasis mine). Scott further argues that, “Coercion, it 
would seem, can produce compliance but it virtually inoculates the complier against 
willing compliance.”106 Scott summarizes various research programs on the effectiveness 
of coercion: 
Providing the threat is sufficiently imposing, overt agreement and 
compliance may prevail but covert reactance will increase. Overt 
compliance in the presence of a threat was often secured only by close 
surveillance to detect and punish deviance. Once the surveillance was 
withdrawn, the compliance evaporated quickly, and it was found that the 
surveillance itself, as an emanation of compulsion, further increased the 
degree of reaction. 
This indicates that coercion not only creates a resistance to compliance on the part 
of the population but it also increases the transaction cost to the group trying to coerce the 
population. This would logically follow that insurgent groups that start with a force 
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disadvantage (as opposed to the state with a force advantage) would find coercion less 
effective and more costly and would choose coercion as a method for mobilization only if 
they had no other options. This argument would also follow that selection of coercion, as 
an insurgency’s sole method of mobilization, would limit the life of the insurgency, 
barring other factors. At the very least, coercion gives the population a reason to conceal 
information from the insurgents, and in an environment where the people are the prime 
source of intelligence for the insurgency, this can be a fatal mistake. 
A second drawback to using coercion is that it requires some overt threat of force 
on the insurgent’s part. This could potentially expose the insurgents to direct repression 
by the state. In addition, the population generally act in their own best interest and seek 
strategies to avoid losing resources to the insurgency.  
To illustrate the drawbacks of using a predominantly coercive insurgency, the 
Greek Communist insurgency of 1946 to 1949 can be briefly examined. The post World 
War II insurgency in Greece grew out of the organized resistance to German occupation 
of Greece from 1941 to 1944. The main resistance group was the National Liberation 
Front (EAM in Greek) and their armed forces the National Liberation Army (ELAS). The 
German occupying army was forced to withdraw in 1944 and was defeated by the Allies 
in 1945. The Greek Communist Party (KKE) saw this as an opportunity to gain power 
over the weak Greek Government returning from exile. The KKE formed the Democratic 
Army (DA) from the victorious ELAS.107  
The DA/KKE started the insurgency in 1946 with a number of advantages over 
the Greek government including significant popular support, a weak opponent (the Greek 
government had legitimacy problems due to perceived collaboration with the Nazis), and 
a weak, untrained, and poorly led Greek Army.108  
Initially, the DA/KKE did not depend on the population for resources as it was 
supplied by the communist Yugoslavian government through the open border of Greece 
with Yugoslavia and it made a decision based on expedience to use coercion to gain 
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recruits.109 By the second year of the insurgency, the main source of new recruits for the 
insurgency was teenagers forced to join through threats to their families.110 When the 
international situation changed and the insurgents lost their support from Yugoslavia, 
they were forced to depend on the population for food and other resources. The insurgent 
leadership chose coercion as the most convenient method to gain resources. The 
DA/KKE used violence against potential government sympathizers in an attempt to 
coerce the people’s support. This tactic backfired and instead of building popular support, 
it exacerbated the population’s fear and resentment of the insurgency. This resulted in the 
further alienation of the population from the insurgents.  
In 1949, the insurgency attempted a conventional engagement with the Greek 
Army, but due to British and U.S. material support, advice, and training, the Greek army 
was able to defeat the insurgent’s conventional attacks soundly. After the defeat of their 
conventional attacks, the insurgency was unable to revert to guerilla tactics because their 
coercive tactics had completely isolated them from the population. The insurgency was 
finished by the end of 1949.111 
E. SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION INTERACTION 
To expand the understanding of a social movement organization and how it may 
interact with an insurgency, one example is examined. The farmer’s liberation association 
(FLA) was a social movement organization that developed in South Vietnam in the late 
1950s and lasted until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, although its most active time 
was 1960-1967. The FLA was created by the Vietnamese Communists but it was not 
simply a tool of the “Viet Cong;” it was a true social movement organization with 
bimonthly meetings, members’ dues, and elected leaders. Its public goals were the 
improvement of the lives of its member farmers. Although it was a nationwide 
organization, the organization’s focus was at the hamlet (small village or rural 
neighborhood equivalent) level. The FLA’s activities included developing a mutual aid 
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system to facilitate farmers to assist their peers, an emergency loan program, and an 
opportunity to allow farmers to seek redress for damages and perceived wrongs. The FLA 
cadre also ensured that the organization received ideological training and was organized 
to support the Vietcong or create pressure on the South Vietnamese government.112 
Robert Andrews, a former Special Forces Officer who served in Vietnam, addresses how 
the Vietcong would use a social movement organization in his book The Village War, 
“Once in a mass organization, villagers became subject to more intense 
indoctrination.”113 This allowed the Vietcong guerillas to maintain a relationship with the 
farmers in each hamlet and use them to support the insurgency. The Vietcong used the 
FLA (as well as many other organizations) to create a local and continuous mobilization 
of the population. 
The apparent trend as exhibited by this insurgency provides the initial indication 
that social movement organizations could potentially be extremely relevant to the success 
of an insurgency. However, instead of conducting a broad statistical analysis of all the 
world’s insurgencies, the focus is on a few case studies allowing the analysis of not only 
whether the insurgency used a social movement organization but also whether it was used 
throughout the life of the insurgency and in what ways it was used.  
F. SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
DIFFERENT METHODS OF MOBILIZATION 
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Table 2.   Comparative Effectiveness of Methods of Mobilization 
If an insurgency gains an advantage from using a social movement organization, 
then the argument is that if there was a way to damage the social movement organization, 
then the second order effect would be to damage the insurgency. The exact type of 
damage the state could inflict on the insurgency would depend on the way in which the 
insurgency used the social movement organization. However, it seems logical that if an 
insurgency chooses to use a social movement organization, then, whatever way it is used, 
removing that option from the insurgency leadership would force them to select a less 
efficient option or to operate without the advantages supplied by the social movement 
organization.  
G. ANALYSIS OF SMO-INSURGENCY NEXUS 
The political process model put forth by Doug McAdam is a valuable tool in 
analyzing how a social movement organization-insurgency nexus really works and what 
makes it grow and die. By using the political process model, it is possible to analyze a 
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social movement organization and determine what methods the state could use to damage 
or more specifically de-mobilize the social movement organization. This leads to the 
second hypothesis, that an insurgency can be damaged through the de-mobilization of its 
sympathetic social movement organization. 
The political process model (PPM) used to analyze the social movements 
examined in this research is based on the work of prominent social scientist such as Tilly, 
McAdam, and Tarrow and synthesized into its present form by McAdam.114 The PPM is 
used to describe the factors that cause the emergence and growth of a social movement 
organization and is a useful set of tools with which to dissect and examine individual 
movements. As McAdam et al. state: 
Increasingly one finds movement scholars from various countries and 
nominally representing different theoretical traditions emphasizing the 
importance of the same three broad sets of factors in analyzing the 
emergence and development of social movements/revolutions. These three 
factors are (1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints 
confronting the movement; (2) the forms or organization (informal as well 
as formal), available to insurgents; and (3) the collective process of 
interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between 
opportunity and action. Or perhaps it will be easier to refer to these three 
factors by the conventional shorthand designations of political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes (emphasis 
mine).  
Each of these three elements is expounded upon briefly. 
H. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES (AND CONSTRAINTS) 
The political structure in the environment in which the movement exists offers 
opportunities or constraints based on the actions and attitudes of the members of that 
structure. The interaction of the movement and the members of the polity, and especially 
the elites in a polity, create an environment that offers opportunities or constraints to the 
movement. According to McAdam et al., “… social movements and revolutions are 
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shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national 
context in which they are embedded.”115 A recent example of changes in political 
opportunities is the change in attitude in much of the polity in Columbia with regard to 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC after the Columbian military’s 
successful rescue of several FARC-held hostages.116 
This definition might be extended to include a global context because in the age 
of globalization, opportunities and constraints can come from abroad; although they are 
still filtered through the local context before they have an effect on a movement. An 
example is the international pressure brought to bear on the Apartheid government in 
South Africa, which created domestic political opportunities for the African National 
Congress.117 
Some “dimensions” of political opportunities that McAdam et al., illustrate are as 
follows. 
• The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 
• The stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a 
polity 
• The presence of elite allies 
• The state’s capacity and propensity for repression 
I. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
McAdam et al., describe mobilizing structures as “those collective vehicles, 
informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective 
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action.”118 This describes the way or the method that the movement uses to organize its 
members. One component of this element is the argument by McAdam et al., that the 
mobilizing structure provides far better insight into the ability of the movement to 
mobilize the population than does an examination of the grievances or issues upon which 
the movement is based. Using this reasoning would lead to the conclusion that it is not 
poverty that causes terrorism to spread; it is well-organized terrorists that cause terrorism 
to spread. 
A second point concerning the mobilizing structure argument is the greater utility 
seen by McAdam et al., in “grassroots” organizing at places of work and at the 
neighbor/village level. They see local institutions as having a superior ability to form and 
maintain effective mobilizing structures.119 
J. FRAMING PROCESSES  
McAdam et al., see the strategic frame as the cognitive function of the people that 
connect the environment (the political opportunity and the mobilizing structure) and the 
actions the movement leadership wants the people to take. As McAdam et al., explain it, 
the framing process is, “mediating between opportunity, organization and action are the 
shared meaning and definitions that people bring to the situation.”120 The shared meaning 
and definitions are expressed in a common ideology that the movement uses, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, to hold the imagination of the people.  
An example can be seen at the conclusion of World War II throughout Southeast 
Asia. Many countries in Southeast Asia were colonies of European powers. The invading 
Imperial Japanese Army easily defeated these powers. The ease with which the Japanese 
drove out the colonial armies as well as President Roosevelt’s anti-colonial remarks 
created a strategic frame in many Southeast Asian countries that they should be 
independent and that it was within the ability of the indigenous population to defeat the 
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returning European armies and gain their independence.121 McAdam calls this “cognitive 
liberation,” for the shift in the common perception that indigenous defeat of European 
armies was really possible. 
K. SYNTHESIS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS 
These three elements (political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes) of the political process model describe the environment and how the movement 
is organized within that environment and finally what the common ideas are of the people 
in the environment. When these three elements are synchronized, either by work of the 
movement leaders or as unintentional consequences of other events, the movement 
emerges as viable. McAdams et al., illustrate the use of the PPM to study the emergence 
of a movement, but the PPM is used not only to study the emergence of a movement, but 
also its growth and decline. It is interesting and, more importantly, potentially of 
enormous practical importance to determine the utility of the PPM as a tool to limit the 
support a social movement can offer an insurgency. If the PPM describes three legs that 
support a movement then does the removal of one of the legs bring about the collapse of 
the movement? This thesis attempts to answer this question. 
Upon examining the chosen cases for this thesis, the corresponding social 
movement organizations are deconstructed according to the political process model; after 
which it becomes possible to ascertain more clearly and more definitely why certain 
demobilization efforts were or were not effective. 
The goal of this thesis is not simply to offer evidence to prove an abstract 
hypothesis (or two) but to distill from this evidence policy suggestions and methods that 
may be of value to counterinsurgent practitioners in the field. The goal is to create 
something of value that the U.S. government and allies can apply. This goal has 
influenced the authors to select a case study methodology with which to conduct this 
thesis. A statistical study method might possibly support the arguments just as well but 
the results of this study may not offer the in-depth analysis that could potentially lead to 
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policy gold (or at least silver). Thus, having determined that the case study method or, as 
named by Lofland, “the qualitative case study method” is the most appropriate for the 
goals, it is then necessary to determine which case studies to examine and how to 
examine them. Lofland’s ideas on this are helpful and were used in the choosing process. 
He argues for the use of four steps in the case study examination selection to include 
collecting, asking questions, and answering questions posed. To select the appropriate 
case study, Lofland suggests using ones that are pertinent, practical, and in which passion 
exists.122 In this regard, case studies relevant to either current conflicts involving the U.S. 
Government (Iraq) or areas relevant to the wider global war of terror (Indonesia) are 
selected so as to be pertinent to current conflicts. The authors have each selected two 
cases each from countries in which they have spent considerable time. In all of these four 
cases, data is available, as well as the access to historical records and individuals that 
participated on one or both sides of the conflict. These satisfied the practical requirement. 
In addition, since both authors participated in conflicts related to these case studies, it has 
invested them with a motivation to seek solutions, which also satisfies the passion 
requirement. Beyond Lofland’s advice, case studies were chosen that allowed for the 
exploration on the change in an insurgency with and without the presence of a social 
movement organization. Identifying and comparing distinct time periods in the evolution 
of an insurgency, when it had and when it did not have the support of a sympathetic 
social movement organization, affords additional evidence as to the utility (or lack 
thereof) that social movement organization provided to the insurgency. In addition, the 
analysis of each case study may offer evidence as to why insurgents either gained or lost 
the connection to social movement organizations; whether through internal decisions, 
believing it was unnecessary for success, or through specific government action, 
believing the disruption of the social movement organization was necessary for the 
insurgents’ defeat.  
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IV. DARUL ISLAM CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Darul Islam (Dar-ul Islam or abode of God) insurgency in West Java started 
in 1948 and lasted until the capture of most of its leaders in 1962.123 At its height, Darul 
Islam fielded a force of over 13,000 fighters124 and maintained the sympathy of a 
majority of the population in their area of control.125 They had sufficient military 
capability to keep the Indonesian Armed Forces at bay and they had created and 
maintained their own civil administration through which they filled the role of legitimate 
government for many of the people in West Java. The conflict cost the people of 
Indonesia over 25,000 in war dead and 120,000 homes destroyed, but far more important 
than the damages inflicted by the conflict was its longevity. Darul Islam gained and 
maintained substantial popular support and lasted over 14 years, representing one of the 
greatest challenges to the Republic of Indonesia.126 Darul Islam is an interesting case as 
they grew out of a social movement organization and maintained an active partnership 
with a variety of SMOs up until the Indonesian government adapted a COIN strategy that 
included creating their own SMOs with which they counter-mobilized the population. 
This new strategy changed the SMO-COIN relationship and lead to Darul Islam’s defeat. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
The Netherland East Indies existed as a colony of the Netherlands from the 
establishment of Batavia (present day Jakarta) in 1615 until the defeat of Dutch forces by 
the invading Japanese Imperial Army in 1942.127 During the colonial period, various 
indigenous political organizations developed as educated native Indonesians worked to 
develop a political role for themselves and to mobilize their countrymen under the Dutch 
colonial rule.128 One such organization was Sarekat Islam (SI), which emerged in 1911 as 
a collective organization for Islamic merchants with a goal to empower these merchants 
with some political leverage to resist the expanding influence of ethnic Chinese Christian 
merchants.129 H.O.S. Tjokroaminato, an astute political entrepreneur who understood and 
successfully leveraged collective action and mobilization to build a powerful and 
influential organization, led SI.130 Tjokroaminato’s two most well-known students were 
future Indonesian president Sukarno, and future Darul Islam leader S.M. 
Kartosuwiryo.131  
Kartosuwiryo was heavily influenced by SI’s success in political mobilization and 
the role that social movement organizations play to mobilize the population and create 
political opportunities. Kartosuwiryo remained politically active in SI and later in its 
successor organization Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) until 1938 when he split 
with PSII and formed his own social movement organization after a disagreement with 
PSII leaders over their cooperation with the Dutch administration.132  
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Through Kartosuwiryo’s new organization, he created the Suffah Institute in 
Malangbong, West Java, the hometown of his wife, as a training center to teach young 
Muslims political as well as religious curricula.133 Malangbong was an opportune 
location as it allowed Kartosuwiryo to tap into his father-in-law’s large informal network 
of religious leaders and scholars throughout West Java.134 
In early 1942, the Japanese invaded the Netherland East Indies or Indonesia, as 
the various nationalist groups had began calling the colony.135 The Japanese initially 
limited all political activity but as the war started to turn against them, the Japanese 
started to encourage political and social movements in an attempt to mobilize the 
population to support the Japanese war machine and prepare for possible defense of 
Indonesia by invading allied forces.136 As part of this mobilization, the Japanese allowed 
several Islamic groups to form or reform. In 1943, the Japanese created the Consultative 
Council of Indonesian Muslims or Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (MASYUMI) as a 
non-political social organization.137 Kartosuwiryo quickly took an active role in the West 
Java branch of MASYUMI and eventually moved to a senior leadership role in the 
national headquarters in Jakarta.138  
In mid-1945, as World War II was drawing to an end, Indonesian nationalists 
started preparing for independence and the potential conflict with returning Dutch 
forces.139 Nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesian Independence on 
August 17, 1945 and the new Republic of Indonesia began building their own armed 
forces out of militia organizations created by the Japanese and former Indonesian 
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members of the Dutch colonial security forces (KNIL).140 The new Indonesian National 
Army called Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI was assisted by a variety of irregular 
militias formed by various groups. MASYUMI became a political party and created two 
irregular military organizations–Sabilillah and Hizbullah141–in West Java. 
Kartosuwiryo’s Suffah Institute was reopened to train these two militias.142  
Indonesia’s fight for independence lasted from 1945 until 1949 and included 
ongoing negotiations between the Dutch and the Republican government formed by the 
rebels, as well as a series of convention and guerilla engagements between the Dutch 
army and the rebel forces. During 1948, the Republican government and the Dutch 
negotiated a cease-fire agreement143 (the Renville Agreement) that included Republican 
forces withdrawing from West Java,144 thus, leaving only the MASYUMI irregular 
militias behind to fight the Dutch Army.145 Kartosuwiryo saw this as a betrayal and this 
greatly diminished his faith in the Republican government. It is probably at this time that 
Kartosuwiryo’s latent desire for an Islamic state was brought to surface in response to 
this deemed betrayal. He has come to a prime position of influence, now that the 
Republican forces had left West Java, only leaving behind guerrilla forces with local 
loyalties, many of which had received guerrilla training at the Suffah Institute. Note that 
as of that time, Kartosuwiryo already had control of the West Java MASYUMI, 
MASYUMI’s armed militias–Sabilillah and Hizbullah, as well as a youth movement 
(known as GPII), a women’s movement, and various affiliated social movements.146 The 
withdrawal of the TNI made him the main person of authority in the resistance movement 
against the Dutch in West Java. 
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Soon after the Renville Agreement, the Dutch captured many of the Republican 
Government’s leaders, including President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta.147 
Kartosuwiryo remained in West Java during this period, He was determined that he and 
the West Java group of MASYUMI organization continue as the only remaining free 
elements of the Indonesian independence movement. He renamed and reorganized the 
West Java MASYUMI into Majelis Ummat Islam (MUI) and began developing a 
constitution148 and a civil administration for the future Islamic state.149 When the TNI 
were eventually able to return to West Java, they were forcibly resisted by the MUI 
military organization formed out of Sabilillah and Hizbullah and now called the Islamic 
Army of Indonesia (TII).150 Kartosuwiryo declared the Islamic State of Indonesian or NII 
on August 7, 1949; it had a standing army of about 4,000 soldiers, a written constitution 
(Kanun Azasi or Islamic Constitution), a civil administration, and political structure 
down to the village level based on the MUI organization.151 
The Dutch released President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta in August 1949. 
The Netherlands and Indonesia eventually signed a peace agreement, with sovereignty 
transferred in December 1949. Once Indonesia gained its sovereignty from the Dutch, the 
Republican government set about the challenging task of transforming a revolutionary 
movement into a state government capable of stabilizing the diverse people and areas of 
Indonesia.152 MASYUMI played a significant role in many of the cabinets of the new 
governments, especially in the first three years of the Republic.153 As MASYUMI 
continued to play a significant role in the new national government, their former 
colleagues now in the Kartosuwiryo-led Darul Islam continued to maintain their Islamic 
State in West Java and resisted calls for a peaceful conclusion to the insurgent 
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movement.154 The Indonesian military was thus tasked with the suppression of the West 
Java Darul Islam insurgency but with limited and inconsistent support from the national 
government155 and a lack of inspired military strategy.156 The TNI was unable to 
overcome a movement with popular support157 and the legitimacy that came from its 
prominent role in the Indonesian revolution and the defeat of the Dutch in West Java.158 
Kartosuwiryo’s influence and those of his followers were also well-embedded in the 
religious and social networks throughout West Java.159 The TNI’s strategy from 1950 to 
1958 was one based on a static defense of valuable terrain and cities and occasional 
forays into the countryside in response to the actions of DI.160 The strategy described by 
the TNI’s own history of the conflict was “conventional and incidental” and the 
stationing of TNI forces was designed for the “passive” defense of key areas. The 
deployment of TNI forces was designed to be static and immobile. This allowed the DI to 
make the initiative in all military encounters as well as to maintain and expand their civil 
administration system.161 
MASYUMI, which played a significant role in the national government until at 
least 1955, also contributed to an environment that did not support a “whole-of- 
government” or inter-agency response to the DI problem. Many members of MASYUMI 
were personal friends of the DI rebels and both organizations believed in the necessity of 
                                                 
154 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 172. 
155 Howard M. Federspiel, Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan 
Islam (PERSIS) 1923 to 1957 (Leiden: Brill, 2001). 
156 Dinas Sejarah TNI AD, Penumpasan Pemerontakan DI-TII/SMK di Jawa Barat (Bandung: TNI 
AD, 1974). 
157 Sartono Kartosuwiryo (son of S. M. Kartosuwiryo leader of Darul Islam), interview by author, 
February 25, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. Recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis 
Department.  
158 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 412. 
159 Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam 
members), interview by author, March 4, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root 
Hall, Defense Analysis Department. 
160 Dinas Sejarah TNI AD, Penumpasan Pemerontakan DI-TII/SMK di Jawa Barat. 
161 Ibid., 98. 
 49
an Islamic state.162 The difference was that DI was willing to resort to violence and 
MASYUMI did not advocate violence as part of their official policy. However, the public 
repudiation of violence to achieve an Islamic state did not diminish MASYUMI’s role as 
obstructionist to coordinated civil military action to keep the DI from achieving 
independence until the dissolving of MASYUMI in 1958.163 
In 1957 to 1958, the TNI, under pressure from TNI Chief of Staff General 
Nasution,164 undertook a review of their counterinsurgency strategy.165 General Nasution 
had spent the last ten years thinking and writing about how to conduct a 
counterinsurgency. In 1953, he wrote a primer on insurgency and counterinsurgency.166 
He stated, “During the three years of anti-guerilla war, we have not succeeded in 
providing a political-psychological and socio-economic basis to put an end to the revolts. 
It is a fact that the general condition has not improved, but deteriorated.”167 He not only 
believed that the grievances of the population must be addressed as part of any effective 
counterinsurgency strategy. He also believed that the population must be mobilized as an 
active ally of the counterinsurgency effort: “We are still awaiting the moment when a 
hopeful people can become the ally in an anti-guerilla war and spontaneously168 
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participate actively in solving its security problems.”169 Nasution envisioned a strategy in 
which all of the government cooperated to address the population’s grievances and then 
organized the population to improve their own environment and isolate and defeat the 
guerrillas.170 This strategy was not possible until the civilian government was prepared to 
participate and the military was prepared to consider means beyond purely military ones.  
With General Nasution’s concept as a starting point, the TNI conducted a 
thorough analysis of their counterinsurgency strategy. The primary outcome from their 
analysis was that the state could not hope to be victorious in a COIN environment “unless 
they could rely on a large measure of popular support.”171 The strategy clarifies the need 
to create and maintain active popular support, not just inactive sympathy; or in other 
words, mobilization of the population. The doctrine that emerged from this conclusion 
became known as “The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial 
Management.” This meant that the Army would have to play a developmental role to 
address some of the population’s grievances as well as a political role to organize and 
mobilize the population.172 At the tactical level, the employment of this doctrine 
specifically in fighting the DI insurgency was known as P4K (pokok pelaksanaan 
pemulihan keamanan) or implementation of basic security recovery.173 The P4K program 
included analysis and classification of individual villages, depending on their level of 
support for the Darul Islam movement and it included active deployment of TNI forces to 
block the lines of communications between DI commanders and individual villages.174 
The TNI would assign military representatives in each village to organize a village 
defense organization (OKD), and to coordinate village development and reconstruction, 
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sometimes referred to as the village mutual development and assistance organization or 
gotong royong.175 The military representative known as the village manager or Babinsa 
(Bintara Pembina Desa) also helped coordinate the local economic projects sponsored by 
the Siliwangi Institute (Yayasan Siliwangi),176 which consisted of economic development 
projects staffed by villagers but supported by the military.177 
The DI’s response to P4K’s success was to declare “The Order of Total War,” and 
DI members were authorized to attack villages and kill people not supporting the 
insurgency.178 Their strategy was an attempt to use coercion to mobilize the population 
as their ability to use SMOs or the DI civil administration rapidly declined. The increase 
in death and destruction further alienated the population of West Java, especially when 
the TNI offered security from the increasingly belligerent actions of DI. DI’s actions in 
the early 1960s stand in sharp contrast to their actions in the early 1950s. Discriminate 
and limited violence against symbols and representatives of the national government had 
degenerated into indiscriminate violence and common banditry against any target of 
opportunity, which seriously diminished their popular appeal.179 
As DI’s popularity plummeted along with its village organizations, DI was forced 
into isolation in the mountainous terrain outside of the villages. DI had to depend on 
force to collect needed resources for its military operations, which further degraded their 
relationship with the local population. As the TNI soldiers worked to organize and 
mobilize the villagers, the relationship between the military and the local population 
began to improve. TNI commanders worked to ensure their men were demonstrating a 
companionate attitude and proper religious piety around the village inhabitants. By 1960, 
the TNI had developed the village defense organizations (OKDs) sufficiently to allow 
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them to assist in “counter-guerrilla” operations searching for the isolated DI fighters. The 
TNI organized sweeps of the mountains around each village, with the majority of the 
manpower coming from the village OKD. This tactic was called pagar betis or fence of 
legs and was proven to be very successful.180 
In 1962, an isolated and wounded Kartosuwiryo was captured in a pagar betis 
operation in the mountains southeast of Bandung.181 Once Kartosuwiryo was captured, 
he was persuaded to issue a public command to his subordinates to surrender. Many DI 
leaders had already surrendered in the year before Kartosuwiryo’s capture because of the 
TNIs’ successful strategy and Kartosuwiryo’s call allowed many of the final commanders 
to surrender. The West Java Darul Islam insurgency was effectively over by the end of 
1962.182 
This analysis of the change in the role of SMOs demonstrates that 1958 is a 
critical year. The role that SMOs played in supporting DI was diminished due to general 
neglect, perhaps due to lack of need as DI maintained a civil administration to 
administrate resources, and connect with the population as needed. The role that SMOs 
began to play in support of the state as the TNI shifted its strategy to engage the 
population is also most apparent in 1958, so the elements of SMT before and after 1958 
will be examined. 
C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE  
1. POS before 1958 
The most evident element of POS available to DI before 1958 is the role that 
MASYUMI played in the government. In the early 1950s, MASYUMI was the largest  
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political party in Indonesia and its leader, Muhammad Natsir, was a member of the 
cabinet on and off from 1946 to 1951; and he continued to play an influential role 
afterwards.183  
Natsir and MASYUMI had high expectations for a parliamentary election in 
1955; however, MASYUMI failed to gain the popular support it expected. MASYUMI 
only gained about 20% of the seats in parliament in combination with other Islamic 
parties. They all still fell short of a majority. MASYUMI’s influence began to diminish 
after the 1955 election as well as the loss of confidence by many members that 
democracy was the way to achieve an Islamic state.184 Natsir eventually supported a 
regional rebellion known as the PRRI185 led by disenfranchised military officers. This 
betrayal, combined with MASYUMI’s poor results in the 1955 election, allowed 
President Sukarno the opportunity to dissolve MASYUMI completely in 1958. Thus, any 
role that MASYUMI as an organization or individual leader in MASYUMI may have 
played as obstructionist to the government campaign to defeat DI was severely 
diminished by 1955 and mostly finished by 1958.186 
The second element of POS before 1958, and arguably the most important, was 
the absence of a political role played by the TNI. In DI-controlled villages, the 
representatives of the national government’s civil service were forced to evacuate under 
pressure from DI fighters. Thus, the DI civil administration was the only organization 
playing the role of legitimate government.187 The TNI strategy of static defense only of 
population centers in West Java allowed the DI the freedom to maneuver and gave them 
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the political space to expand and maintain their influence, first through the MUI and later 
through the established DI civil service.188 The TNI’s neglect of the political space at the 
village level created political opportunity, of which the DI took advantage.189 The TNI, 
in effect, gave up the political space in the villages to the DI insurgents. 
2. POS after 1958 
The exclusion of MASYUMI from the government in 1958 combined with 
President Sukarno’s declaration of martial law and eventual adaptation of “Guided 
Democracy” shifted the available political opportunities away from any political 
opposition groups.190 Thus, this limited the utility for other Islamic political parties or 
SMOs to make common cause with DI.  
The TNI’s new freedom to operate, combined with the shift in strategy outlined 
by General Nasution and the TNI strategy committee, led to the Siliwangi Division’s 
successful application of the P4K strategy.191 The political and operational limitations 
placed on the TNI before 1958 may have been a blessing in disguise. Without the P4K 
strategy and the recognition of the role of popular support, simply allowing the TNI more 
freedom to operate may have resulted in more destruction and more civilian casualties. 
This would have made what was later to become a successful mobilization effort far more 
difficult to achieve because the population would probably have been less supportive of 
the TNI.192 
Instead, in 1958, armed with new political leeway and a new strategy focused on 
building popular support and mobilizing that supportive population to assist the 
government’s forces, the political opportunities available to the DI quickly began to 
evaporate. The TNI development strategy reestablished legitimacy of the central 
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government and their organization of local SMOs allowed the counter mobilization of the 
population. As the TNI began to invade the political space of each village, the military 
and civilian representatives of DI were forced out. By the beginning of the 1960s, DI’s 
hold on village life was severely diminished.193 
D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
1. MS before 1958 
The foundation of the DI network comprised four identifiable but somewhat 
overlapping elements. The first element was the two MASYUMI-sponsored militias that 
fought the Dutch in West Java, which became the only representative of the armed 
struggle for independence when the republican forces evacuated West Java after the 
Renville Agreement in January 1948.194  
The second element was former students of Kartosuwiryo’s political-religious 
Suffah Institute in Malangbong.195 The Suffah Institute was a training institute in the 
“religio-political field.” Its graduates were trained to focus on building political space for 
the future Islamic State through mobilization and military operations.196 
The third element was the religious and political leaders that were part of 
Kartosuwiryo’s father-in-law’s network and eventually came to support Kartosuwiryo 
during his work for political mobilization to defeat the Dutch. This group, known as 
kiyayi, were bound together through a network of personnel connectors with the teachers 
of their respective religious boarding schools known as pesantrens. As an example the 
West Java town of Tasikmalaya had 983 pesantrens with approximately 170,000 students 
all tied into this network.197 This element also included the village leaders who 
eventually supported DI.  
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The last element was the former members of the West Java branch of MASYUMI 
that created a new SMO with Kartosuwiryo in 1948–the MUI, which was part of 
Kartosuwiryo’s process for building an Islamic State.198  
In addition to these elements, there also existed an organization called Urban DI, 
which supported the DI from the national capital in Jakarta. This organization built 
relationships with overt Islamic SMOs in Jakarta to access their resources. Urban DI 
would collect information and resources in Jakarta and smuggle them to DI-controlled 
areas.199 These elements made up the military and civilian components of DI and were 
responsible for mobilizing the population, controlling resources and defending the 
territory of DI.200 
2. MS after 1958 
The mobilizing structure, in which DI was created and maintained, began to 
change as a result of the shift in the TNI strategy in 1958. The two most important 
components of P4K that led to TNI’s successful counterinsurgency efforts were first, the 
strategy to secure individual villages and eliminate the lines of communication between 
DI elements; and second, the mobilization of villagers through TNI-supported security 
and development organizations. This forced local DI representatives to operate in a 
vacuum and began to cause the breakdown in DI’s organizational cohesiveness.  
Simultaneously, the focus on village security and popular support limited the role 
that DI’s civilian administration could play in a village. Once DI civil servants were 
forced out of a village, then the DI lost their best method for mobilizing the population 
and DI became an isolated network existing only in the nearby mountains.201 
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E. STRATEGIC FRAMES 
1. SF before 1958 
The ideology of building an Islamic state, combined with the protection of 
traditional roles of village and religious leaders, comprised the foundation for DI’s 
strategic frame. The strategic frame built by Kartosuwiryo and his followers was based 
on two main themes. The first theme was the idea that an Islamic State was a “gift from 
God;” as such, it was the duty of every Muslim to strive for the implementation of an 
Islamic State. Thus, DI’s efforts to create and maintain the NII were blessed by Allah and 
should be supported by all good Muslims. A government that was not based on Islamic 
law such as the secular Indonesian Republic was thus argued to be a government of 
infidels regardless of whether the actual leaders were Muslims or not.202  
The second theme was that DI was the only legitimate government that defended 
and cared for the people of West Java. Since the Republican forces withdrew from West 
Java under Dutch pressure in 1948, and the Dutch captured the Republican leadership 
soon after, the DI, with its military and civilian arms, were the only organized 
government the people of West Java had during much of 1948 and 1949. In fact, 
Kartosuwiryo claimed that the Indonesian secular rebellion had failed and that DI was the 
only real rebellion still fighting for independence.203 After the withdrawal of the Dutch 
and with formal sovereignty passing to the Republican government, many people in West 
Java still saw DI as the only truly legitimate government, only DI had proved themselves 
worthy of the respect and obedience of the people of West Java.204  
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After 1958, members of Urban DI still worked through Islamic SMOs in Jakarta 
to funnel resources to DI in West Java. However as the TNI’s security strategy 
progressed, the TNI were able to limit the access that DI members in Jakarta were able to 
have with members in West Java.205 
Several other elements facilitated the acceptance of these two main themes of 
religious duty and proven loyalty. First, Kartosuwiryo maintained a reputation as a mystic 
leader with an aura of invincibility. This resulted from Sufi tendencies many Muslims in 
West Java favored. The Sundanese206 have a legend of a just king returning to lead the 
people out of turmoil, which also inspired many to believe that Kartosuwiryo was that 
just king. Regardless of whether the people of West Java truly believed Kartosuwiryo 
was a returning just king or invincible to gunfire, they did see him and DI as protectors of 
traditional values, which many people found appealing after the turmoil of Japanese 
occupation and the anti-Dutch rebellion.207 
2. SF after 1958 
Leading up to the TNI change in strategy in 1958, the TNI had maintained a 
propaganda effort to cast the DI members as criminals and thugs; naturally, it was more 
successful in non-DI areas than in areas where DI had popular support.208  
Since the TNI units remained static before 1958 (especially even more so just 
prior to it), they ceded the strategic frames to the DI; but after 1958, when TNI units 
became active in the villages, they then had the opportunity to counter DI’s strategic 
frames directly.  
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DI’s argument that they, and not the republican government, were the only 
adherents to a just Islamic government began to fall apart as the TNI made an effort to 
treat the villagers with respect. TNI soldiers would participate in worship with local 
villagers and demonstrate that they were as devout as the DI fighters were. As the TNI 
strategy progressed and DI lines of communication and resource lines broke down, DI 
members frequently abused locals in an effort to gain resources, which simply added to 
the TNI’s position that cast DI members as criminals. Once Kartosuwiryo declared his 
total war strategy and allowed his soldiers to kill any Muslim that did not actively support 
DI, their reputation even worsened. 
DI’s second theme, that of being the only legitimate government, also broke down 
as the TNI established themselves as protectors of the villagers and defenders against the 
crimes of DI. As the Siliwangi Division organized villages to conduct development 
programs as well as self defense, they eventually regained much of the legitimacy they 
had lost in 1948, which critically affected the cohesiveness of DI’s strategic frames.209 
F. THE BENEFITS OF USING SMOS 
1. For Darul Islam 
During the emergence of the DI insurgency, the insurgent leaders already had 
relatively unrestricted access to the population but they needed a mechanism to mobilize 
and organize the population to support the insurgency. They also needed a mechanism to 
overcome potential free-rider tendencies in the population. The SMO of the local 
MASYUMI, and later the MUI, offered the solution. SMOs formed the basis for 
Kartosuwiryo to create his Islamic state. In the words of his son, “MASYUMI, the MUI 
the Islamic constitution, and finally the DI civil administration were all part of the 
process to develop the Islamic State.”210 The use of the West Java branch of MASYUMI 
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allowed Kartosuwiryo a readymade organization with deep ties into individual villages 
with which he could organize and mobilize individual population groups. Once West 
Java MASYUMI was converted to MUI, it became even more his vehicle to transform 
the society of West Java into his vision of an Islamic state. 
In the latter stages of the insurgency, DI continued to gain benefits from SMOs, 
but in a different way. Using sympathetic members of SMOs outside of the conflict area–
mostly in Jakarta, DI gained material resources through supplies and information passed 
to them from members of Jakarta-based SMOs such as PERSIS.211 
2. For the State 
In 1958, when the state began its revised COIN strategy, it needed a mechanism 
to reconnect with the population, mobilize the population for development and security, 
and push DI representatives out of the village political space. For the state, SMOs 
initially provided a mechanism to assist the TNI in implementing their security and 
development programs. The development strategy was critical to reestablishing the 
state’s legitimacy and the use of SMOs to assist in the implementation allowed a limited 
number of TNI resources to be multiplied through collective action. It also had an added 
benefit of keeping a local “face” on much of the development. In this way, they could 
overcome the local population’s concern about potential dominance of the central 
governance. SMOs also helped the TNI overcome a natural free-rider response as 
villagers may appreciate the development programs provided by the state but may still 
have the inclination to support the insurgency. 
G. STATE RESPONSE 
The initial state response to the DI insurgency could be described as inconsistent. 
The conflict began when the TNI returned to West Java in 1948 and expected the DI to 
play the role of an ally just as they were before the Renville Agreement. Thus, the TNI 
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were completely ill-prepared to fight the DI and continued to focus on defeating the 
Dutch. Once the Dutch were defeated, the Indonesian government‘s first priority was to 
develop an effective government to manage the vast territory they had just inherited. Part 
of the new government’s new organization included some MASYUMI members as part 
of the cabinet. The national organization of MASYUMI, although distinct from the 
regional MUI organization that supported DI, was still sympathetic to DI’s goals and 
advocated a strategy of negotiations. The TNI application of an amnesty and integration 
policy in conjunction with large-scale search and destroy operations had little effect on 
DI. By 1957, which was to be the high-water mark for DI, the rebellion had about 13,000 
active soldiers, not including supporters or sympathetic social movement members; and 
they were able to recruit approximately 1,000 new members each year.212  
DI’s growth in 1957 coincided with the return of TNI General Nasution’s focus 
on the conflict in West Java. General Nasution had been the Siliwangi Division 
commander during the fight for independence against the Dutch and was very familiar 
with West Java and the events during the Renville Agreement, but even more important 
was his eventual success against the Dutch and his understanding of insurgency and 
guerrilla warfare as a guerrilla.213  
During the formation of the newly independent Indonesia, General Nasution 
developed a strategy called “Total People’s Warfare” as a way for a relatively weak 
Indonesia to defend itself from a stronger invading force. Nasution developed a plan to 
mobilize the population to replay their guerrilla role just as they had against the Dutch for 
a future conflict. This required the TNI to maintain and develop a close relationship with 
the rural population on which this “guerrilla force” would depend and to cultivate 
effective organizations with which to mobilize the population when needed.214 He also 
theorized that the application of this strategy is a useful tool to counter guerrilla warfare. 
Although Nasution had developed this strategy in the early 1950s and articulated it in a 
book called Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare, which he wrote in 1952, national and 
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personal events kept him from applying his strategy in West Java until 1958.215 Up to 
1958, when Nasution had turned his attention the conflict in West Java, the TNI’s 
Amnesty and Integration strategy, combined with a short duration search and destroy 
mission, has produced little effects.216 
H. CONCLUSION 
The success of the TNI strategy lies with the change in the TNI attitude toward 
the people of West Java and in their concept of how to conduct an anti-guerrilla war. 
However, does their success cast any light on the research question? Did the change in 
DI’s use of SMOs as a mobilization tool alter their effectiveness?  
DI originated as an SMO, with its foundation in the West Java MASYUMI 
branch, which became the MUI. When the DI’s military strength grew strong enough to 
allow them to keep Republican civil servants out of the villages, the DI’s own civil 
servants filled government roles. At this point then, West Java DI no longer needed a 
local SMO to make contentious claims against the government because they were the 
government and thus worked to limit contention in their villages. Where DI continued to 
need SMOs was at a national level as a provider of resources. Because the DI-controlled 
area was limited and they were limited in the amount of overt trade they could conduct 
with other areas of Indonesia, DI needed some method to access resources beyond their 
geographic limitations. DI depended on resources provided through their relationship 
with SMOs such as MASYUMI, GPII and PERSIS.217 DI’s relationship with these 
SMOs, mostly located in Jakarta, allowed DI to facilitate a surrogate mobilization of 
sympathetic Muslims outside of the TNI reach, and thus, laid claim to resources beyond 
their geographic scope.  
The TNI did not initially consider SMOs in their strategy, reasonable since DI 
was not using SMOs but an overt civil service, which was effectively disrupted as TNI 
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troops returned to individual villages. The TNI strategy did have the effect of counter-
mobilization but not on demobilization. To implement Nasution’s strategy, Colonel 
Adjie, the Siliwangi commander built his own SMOs: the village defense committee and 
the village development committees, which were designed and supported by the TNI and 
were maintained by the Babinsa, the TNI village coordinator. 
Clearly, the role of SMOs on both sides, although not the only factor in the 
conflict’s outcome, played a critical role in the outcome. The utility of SMOs as a 
mobilizing element allowed DI to emerge and grow. DI grew enough to the point where it 
displaced Republican influence and in effect allowed them to establish a secure 
geographic area. Then, the DI turned their SMOs into a civil administration. Once the 
TNI changed their strategy and began working in villages to displace the DI influence, 
they were successful; and the DI, which by then was without any local SMOs on which 
they could depend, were defeated.  
The TNI executed a successful counter-mobilization of the population after 1958 
where they harnessed the population through their own SMOs and mobilized them to 
counter DI’s influence. The most famous military tactic used by the TNI in West Java 
was the pagar betis; this was a direct result of that successful counter-mobilization. The 
success of this tactic serves to indicate the triumph of TNI counter-mobilization on the 
population of West Java.  
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V. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This case study explores the relationship between the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
movement and several social movement organizations, some created by Jemaah 
Islamiyah and some that have emerged independently but with sympathy for Jemaah 
Islamiyah’s goals. This case study shows that JI has become more resilient to state 
repression since it switched its strategy of mobilization following the aftermath of the 
Bali bombing.  
To test the hypothesis that insurgencies that use social movement organizations 
mobilize populations more efficiently, the JI movement is examined from its emergence 
in 1993 to its current operation. JI has been responsible for a series of terror attacks in 
Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia since its inception. A string of church bombings 
on Christmas Eve 2000, a bomb attack in 2000 against the Philippines ambassador to 
Indonesia, and the devastating Bali bombing of 2002 are just a few of the attacks 
attributed to JI.218 JI began as an insurgency with a focus on building a small 
underground organization or vanguard with limited desire to mobilize a mass base;219 
thus, it had little use for social movement organizations then. However, over the course 
of its development, JI changed its strategy to include mobilization of the population.220 
To build popular support and develop a mass appeal, JI’s leadership began to utilize 
social movement organizations.221 This shift in strategy presents an opportunity to 
examine the relative efficiency of JI as an insurgency before and after they started using 
social movement organizations (SMO).  
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. The Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah 
The group Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah, or more commonly known as Jemaah 
Islamiyah or simply JI, was created in early 1993 by two Islamic militants associated 
with the Darul Islam movement.222 The founders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir, developed a difference of opinion with the Darul Islam leadership, which 
prompted them to split from DI and form a new organization. JI was built around the 
existing network of DI supporters, especially some of the DI members that Sungkar had 
helped travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1980s to receive military training in 
camps sponsored by the organization that would later become Al-Qaeda.223 Initially 
based in Malaysia to avoid Indonesian government repression,224 Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
created their organization from the readymade cadre of trained and experienced militants 
drawn from the DI network.225 The goal of JI, similar to DI, remained the establishment 
of an Islamic state in Indonesia or, in Sungkar’s words, “to establish Dawlah Islamiyah 
(an Islamic state) by means of jihad.”226 
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To achieve the goal of establishing Islamic state, Sungkar’s political analysis or 
ijtihad politik is that JI should remain an underground organization until time is ripe.227 
He saw the establishment of a strong Islamic community or jama’ah as the first step in 
the eventual conversion of Indonesia from a secular liberal democracy into a strict sharia 
state.228 Sungkar believed that his jama’ah must remain a small elite community or 
vanguard focused on building its strength. This indicates that Sungkar did not see the 
need to build popular support as a requirement to replace the Indonesian government. 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir designed their organization as a secret isolated organization, not a 
mass movement.229 
To facilitate the development of the organization, the leadership of JI drafted the 
PUPJI (the General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah) in 1996 to give 
the senior leadership guidance on how to develop the organization. The PUPJI set up a 
well-defined organizational structure for JI and defined the method by which JI should 
achieve its goals. The PUPJI outlined geographic commands called Mantiqis with 
responsibility to control individual fiah (cells) within its area of responsibility. To 
establish an Islamic state, the PUPJI called for a core group (Qiy’adah Rosyidah) to be 
used as a vanguard to create and nurture a solid base (Qoi’dah Sholabah) of followers. 
These followers were expected to provide mutual support to other members but remain a 
secret organization (Tandzim Sirri) building its military strength until such time they 
were able to establish a secure base (Qoi’dah Aminah) from which JI was able to launch  
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military operations against the rest of Indonesia.230 As one JI member described JI under 
Sungkar this way: “[W]e are not a mass organization…we want people who will be loyal 
to the aims of the group.”231 
2. Reconsidering the Role of Popular Support (Mobilize or Die) 
JI, as a movement, changed its mind about the necessity of mobilization of 
popular support and political engagement soon after the fall of the authoritarian Suharto 
regime in Indonesia and the death of Abdullah Sungkar, both of which occurred in the 
late 1990s.232 During 1999 (after Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesian and near 
the time of Sungkar’s death), JI conducted a strategy seminar. The members decided that 
the Muslims of Indonesia were weak in their religious devotion thus “the people are not 
ready” and “sharia [may be] perceived as a burden.”233 Therefore, the participants agreed 
on a hybrid strategy to focus on building a safe area or a “secure base” within Indonesia 
from which they could establish sharia as well as launch military operations against the 
rest of Indonesia in conjunction with a program to prepare the rest of the population of 
Indonesia for eventual implementation of sharia. Whether Sungkar attended this seminar 
is unclear but it is about this same time that Sungkar died and was replaced as JI emir by 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.234 Whether Ba’asyir already had a method in mind for preparing of 
the population at this point is also unclear but the success of another radical Islamic 
organization was to show him a potential solution.  
During 1999, another radical Islamic group emerged with similar goals to JI but 
diametrically different methods to achieve those goals. Laskar Jihad or The Jihad 
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Paramilitary Force emerged during the turmoil following Suharto’s resignation.235 Laskar 
Jihad (LJ) was an overt Islamic social movement organization dedicated to shifting 
Indonesian’s secular government toward an Islamic state.236 Some Islamic elements in 
the TNI as well as the Indonesian civilian government saw the utility of a radical Islamic 
group publicly calling for more Islamic influence in the Indonesian government. Starting 
in January 2000, LJ organized several mass rallies in Jakarta to protest the communal 
violence occurring between Christians and Muslims in the Maluku Islands (an area in 
eastern Indonesia); the largest rally was in April 2000 with approximately 100,000 
participants.237 LJ claimed that the government was failing to protect Muslims so they 
organized a militia to travel to the conflict area and fight the local Christians. LJ’s 
activities had the support of elements in the government (Amien Rais, speaker of 
Parliament, and Hamzah Haz, a future Indonesian vice president, both spoke at LJ rallies) 
and the military (military units provided training, transportation and possibly weaponry). 
Even politicians who were opposed to the vigilantism of LJ were reluctant to speak out 
against them for fear of alienating their constituents.238 LJ accumulated popular support 
and at its height had about 10,000 members. It garnered support from civilian and 
military leaders including financial, training, and logistical support and its popularity 
effectively shielded its members from government repression as in the case of LJ’s 
founder Jafar Thalib who was arrested, then released, rearrested and tried but 
acquitted.239 
The popular support and resources that LJ quickly accumulated, as well as the 
political shield against repression, most likely influenced Ba’asyir as he was considering 
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the evolution of JI after Sungkar’s death. Along with current events, the Darul Islam 
(especially the West Java conflict led by S.M Kartosuwiryo), had always influenced 
Ba’asyir.240 Ba’asyir looked to Kartosuwiryo as a role model and Kartosuwiryo grew his 
rebellion out of a social movement organization.241 The combination of Kartosuwiryo’s 
example and the mobilization success of LJ seem to have prompted Ba’asyir to consider 
popular mobilization through SMOs as a better course of action to achieve JI’s goals than 
a completely secret vanguard organization, which had shown little success.  
Ba’asyir established the MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian 
Mujahidin Council) in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in August 2000, as an umbrella 
organization that sought to link various social and political organizations committed to 
the establishment of Islamic law in Indonesia.242 MMI is an overt public organization 
using the Indonesian political system243 to mobilize resources to support its sharia 
goals.244  
MMI and JI followed in the footsteps of LJ and mobilized their own associated 
militias to respond to communal violence in the Maluku Islands as well as Central 
Sulawesi. These militias, known as Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah, were more 
overt or public than JI and traveled to the conflict areas with much media fanfare. This 
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fear of government repression. It also allowed MMI, in cooperation with KOMPAK, 
another Islamic SMO, an opportunity to distribute videos of the conflict to donors and 
potential recruits in Java.245 
The creation of MMI exacerbated an existing schism in JI. Hambali, the 
operational chief of JI as well as commander of Mantiqi 1 and many other members of 
Mantiqi 1, still favored Sungkar’s concept of a secret vanguard organization as well as 
the Al Qaeda model of attacking targets associated with the West. This faction remained 
more influential due to greater resources246 and also because, simply, it was more active. 
The Philippine Ambassador and Christmas Eve bombings of 2000 were mostly Mantiqi 1 
projects that probably did not have Ba’asyir’s full support.247 Many JI members, 
especially from Mantiqi 1, had been disappointed with Ba’asyir as emir and were less 
influenced by his leadership. As Ba’asyir worked to expand JI’s ability for dakwah or 
outreach. Hambali worked to expand JI’s preparation for jihad. For operational matters, 
Hambali was the strategist and leader.248 By 2001, JI members had built an infrastructure 
to harness popular support for mobilization. However, JI had limited success as more 
influential members were still focused on bombing and other terroristic acts rather than 
popular mobilization.  
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3. The Bali Bombing 
The Bali bombing in 2002 that killed 202 people,249 many of them foreigners, 
brought a quick response from the Indonesian government.250 The Indonesian National 
Police (INP), with technical assistance from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and the 
U.S. Government’s Anti-terror Assistance Program (ATA), were very successful in 
capturing the bombing cell and eventually capturing or killing most of the JI members 
directly associated with the bombing.251 The bombing also encouraged the INP to form a 
specialized anti-terror police unit known as Densus 88 or Detachment 88.252 This unit 
continues to be very successful in breaking up JI bombing cells.253 The indiscriminate 
nature of the Bali bombing gave the Indonesian Government greater legitimacy to break 
up what some people had seen as a religious community.254  
The effective Indonesian repression of JI, especially on elements of Mantiqi 1, 
allowed Ba’asyir’s followers to gain ascendancy inside JI but caused the deterioration of 
the formal structure of JI. JI morphed into a less rigid structure of like-minded 
individuals, many of whom have accepted Ba’asyir’s desire to engage in the political 
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violence;255 JI’s leadership has not given up the use of violence but it now simply sees 
random acts of violence, especially against innocent Muslims or western targets, as 
counterproductive.256  
In addition to targeted violence, former JI emir Ba’asyir has dedicated 
considerable energy to building up the MMI as a social organization that can create 
political pressure on local and national governments, as well as enhance the public image 
of radical Islam.257 Recently, Ba’asyir has left MMI and created a second overt social 
movement organization called Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid or JAT. Although members of 
MMI and JAT disagree on some administrative issues, they all share the desire to install 
an Islamic State in Indonesia. Thus, the covert JI organization along with overt MMI and 
JAT, have formed an overt/covert team with fairly effective division of labor and 
specialization of mobilization tasks.258  
4. Jemaah Islamiyah and Social Movement Organizations 
Sometime in late 1999, the ascendant leadership in JI decided that SMOs can play 
a valuable role in the development and expansion of its own underground organization 
and in the mobilization of the population.  
Jemaah Islamiyah is an insurgency, an underground movement and it uses 
above ground organizations [SMOs] in order to channel and facilitate their 
political activities…MMI was created by Ba’asyir in order to facilitate JI’s 
political activities… although there was some debate within JI, Ba’asyir 
insisted that MMI was needed…Ba’asyir knows that the environment in 
Indonesia is favorable to [Islamic] movements as long as they are not 
committing violence against Muslims…Ba’asyir knows that he will be 
immune from government repression as long as they do not incite people 
directly to commit violence…there is a reluctance of law enforcement 
agencies to apply strict measures against Ba’asyir’s above ground 
organization…the environment [in Indonesia] will not allow stern 
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measures against organizations that are threatening but not actively 
engaged in violence…MMI and JAT can grow and expand and can 
challenge government without fear of repression.259  
Ba’asyir and his supporters see the role of SMOs as the most effective way to gain 
resources and, more importantly, challenge the government.260 
JI has adopted three methods for use of SMOs. First, it creates, or more 
accurately, some of its members facilitate the creation of an SMO aligned with the goals 
of JI and can fill gaps in JI’s operation that it cannot fill as an underground organization. 
The most apparent examples of the method are MMI and JAT, which are explored later in 
this chapter. As addressed in Chapter II, insurgencies desire a strong link to the 
population. In this case, MMI and JAT provide JI’s that link.  
Second, JI partners with or allows its associated SMOs to partner with other 
SMOs that have similar short-term or long-term goals. This is apparently justified by the 
concept of tansiq bainal jama’ah or collaboration.261 The most apparent example of this 
is JI’s partnership with groups such as KPPSI, HTI, FPI, and KOMPAK.262  
Lastly, JI has also taken the opportunity to allow its operational cells to infiltrate 
other SMOs, usually sympathetic but legitimate non-violent organizations and then use 
that membership to gain access to the organization’s members and resources to facilitate 
JI’s activities. The most recent example of this strategy was exposed in June 2008 when 
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police in Indonesia arrested a JI cell planning the bombing of a café in Palembang, 
Sumatra. The JI bombing cell members were also members of a local SMO known as 
FAKTA (Anti-apostasy Movement Forum). Analysis of this bombing cell by the 
International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)263 
indicates that the use of FAKTA by the JI bombing cell was an intentional strategy to 
enable JI to gain access to FAKTA’s resources and operate more effectively.264 
A pattern emerges where JI intentionally uses an SMO either through deception 
such as in the Palembang/FAKTA case, through a temporary partnership with like-
minded organizations such as the HTI and KOMPAK, or through the intentional creation 
of a sympathetic social movement organization as in MMI or JAT.265  
C. ACTIVITIES OF MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA AND JAMA’AH 
ANSHARUT TAUHID 
To explore the relationship between JI and social movement organizations further, 
the examination focuses on MMI and JAT.  
1. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir organized the “first national congress of mujahidin”266 in 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia in August 5-7, 2000 to bring together various groups that were 
striving for the implementation of sharia law in Indonesia. The conference was attended 
by representatives of radical groups as well as mainstream organizations such as NU267 
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and Muhammadiyah268 (according to Ba’asyir).269 The conference concluded with the 
formation of MMI as an SMO270 with the goal to harness the collective energies of the 
other groups to install sharia in Indonesia. Although MMI and JI have basically the same 
goals and many of the same members,271 MMI has been careful to define its goal as 
implementation of sharia law and not the change of the Indonesian government. This 
allows them to operate overtly without the threat of a government charge of treason.272 
MMI has about 100 radical groups within its organization and about 30 branches 
throughout Indonesia. Its leadership consists almost entirely of radical Islamists.273 
Zachary Abuza interviewed Ba’asyir about the role of MMI and states: 
The MMI is an institution where a lot of people from a lot of Muslim 
groups including NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah274 gather at 
one table to discuss how to get our vision of sharia implemented into 
national laws… The long-term strategy is to get Indonesia 100 percent 
based on sharia. As long as Muslims are in the majority, the country 
should be ruled by sharia.275 
Recently, MMI has focused on changing peraturan daerah (PerDa) or local 
government regulation. These are regulation set by local governments such as city 
mayors or town councils.276 MMI representatives and local affiliates place pressure on 
local government officials to encourage local government to implement certain elements 
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of sharia law. As examples of this trend, some local governments in West Java and South 
Sulawesi have made it illegal for women to leave their homes without wearing the 
Islamic headscarf or to travel after dark without a male escort. Their plan is to pressure 
local governments gradually to enact some laws now so that in the future, when there is a 
nationwide struggle to implement complete sharia law, then those areas already operating 
under partial sharia law will be supportive of a complete sharia law.277 Some Indonesian 
analysts call this “sedikat-sedikat” or Indonesia for “just a little” to describe this strategy 
of piecemeal implementation of sharia.278  
This strategy of “eroding the margins” may make eventual change in Indonesian 
government more acceptable.279 In the short term, it allows JI to expand the perceived 
legitimacy of their activities; thus, giving them more “political space.”280 
MMI also plays the role of offering radical foreign elements, such as from Saudi 
Arabia, a point of contact for transfer of resources.281 Donors include the Islamic 
International Relief Organization, Al Haramain, and the World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth, which may share the goals of JI but would have difficulty in donating funds 
directly to the underground organization.282 
2. Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) 
JAT was also created by Ba’asyir as an SMO to mobilize Indonesian popular 
support for sharia. JAT was created in mid-2008 in a suburb of Jakarta, focused its 
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energy on dakwah or religious outreach, and has begun to play the role of contact 
organization for potential JI members. JAT is becoming the “open face” of JI, thus 
allowing members of the community inspired by JAT or other radical Islamic groups’ 
message to have a public point of contact.283 Many members of JI and JAT believe that 
the “community is not yet ripe for jihad” so more preparation, recruitment, and 
mobilization is required.284 For this task, JAT is filling the role that an underground and 
secretive organization such as JI could not play without drawing rapid government 
repression. JAT is the mechanism that allows JI members unrestricted access to the 
population to proselytize and exacerbate grievances all without fear of government 
repression.285  
One senior Indonesian National Police (INP) counterterrorism officer believes 
that MMI and JAT have worked out a division of labor. MMI is responsible for 
rebuilding the former JI and DI network,286 building political pressure especially at local 
governments,287 and facilitating the receipt of donations from Middle Eastern Islamic 
charities.288 On the other hand, JAT has the role of recruiting new members not formerly 
in JI’s network, making common cause, and building collaboration with other Islamic  
 
 
                                                 
283 Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam 
members), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root 
Hall, Defense Analysis Department. 
284 Noor Huda Ismail (Indonesian analyst, social entrepreneur, former student at JI associated 
boarding school), interview by author. March 5, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia. 
285 Badrus Sholeh (lecturer Islamic University of Indonesia), interview by author. February 24, 2009, 
Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. 
286 Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. 
February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. 
(Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement) 
287 Interview, ICPVTR Analyst, (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, 
recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in 
confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement) 
288 Means, Politcal Islam in Southeast Asia, 171. 
 79
radical groups to facilitate their goals.289 Both organization share overlapping 
membership with JI, as an ICPVTR analyst puts it, “it’s the same people,” just working at 
complementary goals through complementary organizations.290  
3. Examination of the Changes in JI Using Social Movement Theory 
(SMT) 
JI’s shift in strategy to include mobilization of the population and its decision to 
use SMOs took place between 1999 and 2002. SMT is used to explore JI’s efficiency 
before and after its decision to use SMOs to mobilize the population. 
D. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Political Opportunities without Social Movement 
Organizations 
The original Darul Islam insurgency and especially the West Java branch under S. 
M. Kartosuwiryo heavily influenced Sungkar and Ba’asyir.291 In addition, Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir were already active in the radical Islamic movement when one such group called 
Komando Jihad was created by former Darul Islam members and then efficiently 
dismantled by Suharto’s security apparatus.292 The apparent lesson Sungkar learned from 
both these movements was that an organization must remain secret and underground until 
it has sufficient military capacity to challenge the state.293 
Political dissent, especially radical Islamic dissent, was not allowed under the 
Suharto regime and would elicit rapid and harsh repression. There was an underlying 
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frustration with many disenfranchised Indonesians and some were able to funnel that 
frustration through participation in non-political religious activities. This was how 
Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and other frustrated radicals worked to build their network first as part 
of a second generation DI movement and later as their own organization. However, the 
members remained a select few that were either members of DI or had participated in 
Sungkar- and Ba’asyir-affiliated religious schools.294 The limited political opportunities 
in Indonesia in the early 1990s forced Sungkar and Ba’asyir to remain in Malaysia until 
the fall of the Suharto regime.295 
2. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Political Opportunities with Social Movement 
Organizations 
The fall of the Suharto regime and the rapid shift from a centralized authoritarian 
government to a decentralized democracy presented JI with a dramatic reorientation of 
political opportunities. These dramatic changes not only allowed Sungkar and Ba’asyir to 
return safely to Indonesia, they also facilitated the rise of overt Islamic militias and civil 
society organizations such as Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). The 
rapid changes in Indonesian’s institutions of power also allowed simmering communal 
and ethnic competition to spiral into violence.296  
Just as political opportunities were opening for JI, the Bali bombing jarred many 
Indonesians with the glaring reality that there were groups inside Indonesia that were 
radical and saw violence and the death of innocent civilians, even fellow Muslims, as a 
legitimate tool with which to achieve their objective. Whereas the INP had been reluctant 
or lacked political support to crack down on overt groups such as Laskar Jihad and the 
Indonesian government had been somewhat slow to participate in regional anti-terrorism 
coordination, the Bali blast motivated the government to reexamine its attitude. The INP 
partnered with foreign law enforcement agencies to catch and try the Bali bombers 
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quickly and the Indonesian president297 accepted more substantial cooperation in anti-
terror activities.298 JI’s political opportunities began to diminish as the INP followed the 
evidence and arrested more and more JI leaders. 
In the years since the first Bali attack, the political opportunities available to JI 
have shifted again, from limited political opportunities under Suharto, to a widening 
under a new democratic government in 1999, to new limitations after the Bali 2002 
bombing, and finally now again to a broadening of political opportunities as the 
Indonesian population began to resent any perceived police heavy handedness. The shock 
of the bombing has faded and world events have given Muslims in Indonesia reason to 
consider the message of Islam under attack. JI has taken advantage of this shift in public 
opinion and thus, “JI has changed their image in order to get popular support.”299 With 
the coming of democracy and the rather abrupt decentralization of the Indonesian 
government, JI found itself in a country where members of government were extremely 
sensitive to popular will. This combination of limited public patience for terrorism but 
popular disagreement with broad government repression limits the tools available to the 
Indonesian police. Thus, political opportunities have expanded for opposition groups 
willing live in the seam between violent opposition and peaceful political participation.  
E. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION OR MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
1. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Mobilizing Structures without Social Movement 
Organizations 
JI’s method to build its mobilizing structure relied on four components–
friendship, kinship, madrassa, and mosque.300  
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JI’s formal creation in 1993 did not mark the start of a new network, just 
the adaptation of an existing network. While still part of the DI organization during the 
1980s, Sungkar facilitated the training of as many as 800 militants301 in camps in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.302 Once Sungkar and Ba’asyir created their new organization, 
many of the members of DI, especially those that owed their military training to the work 
of Sungkar, changed to support JI.303  
b. Kinship 
The family connection is one of the strongest foundations upon which the 
JI network is based. Family members are recruited because they are less likely to betray 
family loyalties and more inclined to follow their senior family members’ ideology. In 
addition, children raised on a steady diet of radicalism will likely reflect this point of 
view as adults. As Angel Rabasa puts it, their network is based on a “family history of 
radicalization.”304 Alternatively, as an Indonesian scholar puts it, jihad is family-
based.305 JI’s network is comprised of family nodes and many alliances are bound 
through marriages.306 
c. Madarassa and Mosque 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir also operated an Islamic boarding school (known as 
madarassa or pesantren) near Solo, Central Java, Indonesia starting in 1972. This offered 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir an opportunity to share their radical ideology with the students. 
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Promising students were selected for specialized training. Students in government-run 
madrassas were also targeted for recruitment.307 The students would then be invited to 
more and more study sessions as the radicalization process would continue.308 Then, 
these special students were encouraged to create other madarassas or were recruited into 
the JI organization.309 Sidney Jones puts the number of JI-affiliated schools currently 
operating at about eighteen.310 
Members recruited through these four methods were installed in the 
structure Sungkar established with a formal military structure and clear delineation of 
areas of responsibilities. The formal structure included an Amir or leader (initially 
Abdullah Sungkar), various administrative sections, and subcommands responsible for 
specific geographic areas called Mantiqis (for example, Mantiqi 1 was responsible for 
Malaysia, Southern Thailand and Singapore).311  
2. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Mobilizing Structures with Social Movement 
Organizations 
Over the first three years of the 21st century, the JI network structure went through 
several significant changes. With the effective government repression of JI after the Bali 
bombing, the Mantiqi organization that represented JI from its inception through 2002 
was effectively broken up. The vanguard organization lost much of its internal 
communications ability as individual members were arrested, killed, or fled. Thus, the 
                                                 
307 The ICG offers this example. A member of Samudra’s group would strike up a conversation with 
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remaining members of JI existed in a flatter and less rigid organization.312 As these 
vanguard leaders lost influence, the “pro-mobilization” elements such as Ba’asyir gained 
ascendancy. As this group shifted their strategy to use SMOs, the mobilizing network 
changed. Many JI members also joined MMI and later JAT. This enabled members to 
continue their activities including some paramilitary training, justified as needed to 
defend fellow Muslims.313  
JI’s core membership built through ties of family and friendship as well as 
networks of religious educational institutions remained; the inclusion of SMOs offered an 
influx of new members with which the core could increase its membership. The SMO’s 
also allowed JI a level of political protection from politicians reluctant to offend their 
constituents; thus, the elements of JI’s network affiliated with SMOs remained relatively 
intact.314  
3. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Framing Process before Social Movement 
Organizations 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir based their networks on shared frame or shared ideology 
very similar to the shared frame of the former Darul Islam insurgency. Their frame was 
based on the concept that devout Muslims must use jihad to achieve an Islamic state and 
devout Muslims must avoid contact with those Muslims and non-Muslims not willing to 
fight for this state. The thogud315 should not be allowed to pollute the pure JI network 
and will not have access to power in the future Islamic state of Indonesia.316 JI would 
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strive to create a state where Islam and politics could be unified and thus “counterbalance 
the secular forces that had caused the enervation and decline of the Islamic Nation.”317 
Before JI shifted its strategy to solicit popular support, their frame only had to 
bind a small audience together; thus, the frame focused on strict adherence to the leader’s 
interpretation of Islam. The focus was on building the community and preparing to forgo 
everything to achieve sharia. In other words, the common organizational frame was a 
function of the necessarily small network and not designed for a wider audience.318 
4. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Framing Process with Social Movement 
Organizations 
Currently, MMI and JAT are having success in building a strategic frame that is 
“more palatable” to the Indonesian people.319 The strategic frame is based on “the other 
as enemy” model in which all oppression of Muslims around the world is attributed to a 
Christian-Jewish conspiracy. MMI, and now JAT, have become very adept at harnessing 
world events to use as a tool to incite the Muslim population. In Muhammad Ahnaf’s 
book The Image of the Other as Enemy, he shows how MMI has used violence against 
Muslims in other countries, as well as parts of Indonesia, to show how Muslims 
throughout the world are under siege and require assistance.320 This frame argues that it 
is the duty of all Muslims to strive for an Islamic State (or implementation of Islamic 
law) and that it is the duty of all Muslims to defend Muslims in Indonesia or throughout 
the world. The MMI and KOMPAK collaboration to produce and distribute videos of 
“Muslim oppression” during the Central Sulawesi communal violence321 and JAT’s 
numerous local preaching programs are just two examples of the proliferation of this 
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frame.322 Where JI had difficulty creating a “sticky message”323 that would appeal to the 
general population, MMI and JAT have begun to have more success.324 In large part, this 
is due to their access. Whereas JI was very limited in their ability to access the population 
with its strategic frames, MMI and JAT have relative freedom to share their frames and 
ideology with the public. 
5. Benefits of JI’s use of Social Movement Organizations 
To measure the quantifiable benefits that JI has gained using SMOs is very 
challenging. Many of these benefits are based on gains of influence or public perception, 
which defy a simple measure of success. However, it is possible to examine what 
elements in the environment insurgents would find necessary or preferable to advance the 
insurgency and see if JI’s sympathetic SMOs have contributed to favorable shifts in the 
environment. Insurgencies are comprised of a combination of the leadership or vanguard 
and the mass base drawn from the population.325 Thus, the vanguard prefers an 
environment where there are limits on the state’s ability to repress the vanguard and the 
vanguard maintains unrestricted access to the population for its mobilization efforts. 
Insurgencies also need an ideology upon which their movement is based and preferably a 
set of grievances with which to support their mobilization efforts. As part of their 
mobilization efforts, the insurgent wants to create and expand the “will to revolt” or 
cognitive liberation326 in which the population believes change is possible through their 
support of the insurgents. Insurgents need access to the population to disseminate their 
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“revolutionary ideas.”327 Then, does the use of sympathetic SMOs give JI some defense 
against repression, greater access to the population, ability to create “cognitive liberation” 
or to influence the population to accept that support for JI can lead to success? If it does 
and if the use of SMOs can do this better than other mobilization methods, then use of 
SMOs is the more efficient. 
In recent years, the specialized police unit Detachment 88 has continued to show 
success in finding and arresting bombing cells associated with JI but it has been limited 
in its success beyond low-level cells. The political will to break up JI’s organization as 
well as their sympathetic SMOs does not exist in the government. Detachment 88 is 
limited to reactionary police work and is not authorized or equipped to address the wider 
organization of the elements of the environment that facilitate JI’s activities.328 
Moreover, JI has also acted against the police. In 2007, Ba’asyir initiated a lawsuit 
against Detachment 88, which although eventually dismissed, did place additional 
scrutiny on the police’s antiterrorism force.329 The influence of Ba’asyir’s SMOs has also 
helped him personally resist U.S. government actions when the government of Indonesia 
denied a request from the U.S. government to extradite Ba’asyir on terrorism charges.330 
Ba’asyir’s extradition request was denied331 because of the Indonesian government’s fear 
of “political instability” if he were turned over to the U.S.332 
Ba’asyir was arrested for his connections to JI and the Bali bombing but that 
conviction was overturned. While he was in prison, Din Syamsuddin, the director of 
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Muhammadiyah333 and a member of MUI,334 as well as Hamzid Haz, the Indonesian vice 
president, visited Ba’asyir.335 This is one example of several in which JI/MMI/JAT 
member leveraged the SMOs to gain access to national leaders and large civil society 
organizations. Once Ba’asyir was released from detention, he was invited by the deputy 
speaker of the house to address the Indonesia parliament.336 MMI and JAT have also 
gained access to local government decision makers. Currently, MMI’s PerDa strategy 
has contributed to the adoption of sharia law in approximately 40 local governments.337 
MMI believes that adoption of sharia law at the local level creates an environment, 
which influences the people to support MMI and JI more. Although it is difficult to judge 
the level of support in specific areas, a 2006 survey of Indonesian Muslims conducted by 
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MMI,338 and even a 9% approval level for the Bali bombing as a method of defending 
Muslims.339 MMI also played a role in the successful lobbying campaign that forced the 
Indonesian government to outlaw the Islamic sect of Ahmadiyah.340  
One final example of the benefit that JI has gained using SMOs is the simple 
access that these SMOs have given JI to the population. MMI and JAT conduct a variety 
of public outreach projects including a successful book publishing business,341 a monthly 
magazine, Risalah Mujahidin,342 and a variety of public preaching and dahwak343 
events.344 JAT commonly conducts outreach sermons at mosques and Islamic centers 
throughout Indonesia. These sermons encourage violent jihad (although not specifying 
against whom), encourage recruitment or donations, and endeavor to convince the 
audience of the righteousness and inevitable victory of the movement.345 These sermons 
are composed of extremely inflammatory language that the Indonesian government 
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allows to continue due to constraints of popularity and political pressure.346 Individual 
politicians are reluctant to speak out against these groups for fear of alienating their 
constituents and the government in general. As one analyst puts it, “There is a disturbing 
level of official indifference.”347 
F. STATE RESPONSE 
The Government of Indonesia (GOI) response has been focused primarily on the 
mobilizing structure and the strategic frames. 
The INP’s successful breakup of the Bali cell was followed up with successful 
arrests of cells operating in Yogyakarta, Central Sulawesi, and Sumatra.348 However, 
beyond the direct action the police take against a cell preparing for a bombing attack, the 
police are limited in their ability to address JI-affiliated organizations not planning or 
have conducted violence. According to one senior INP officer, the political will does not 
currently exist for us to break up the entire network or to stop radical groups from 
expanding their network.349  
The GOI has also begun to address the JI framing process through a counter 
ideology program. The program is focused on de-radicalizing members of JI that have 
been arrested and are in prisons. The program also works with the family of the JI 
member to ensure that when they are released and come home, their environment is less 
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through further counseling and job assistance.350 In some cases, the police have been 
successful in changing community attitudes through exemplary police work351 and 
community outreach programs.352 
This leaves a significant gap in the GOI strategy, as they have taken no steps to 
address the political opportunities available to JI and its SMO affiliates. The lack of 
political will that allowed JI to partner with SMOs still exists and still allows JI to carry 
out activities with overt SMOs that are otherwise impossible or difficult to accomplish as 
an underground organization.353  
What else can GOI do in the future to defeat JI? The GOI’s “…best strategy is to 
co-opt the less extreme members…give them a voice in government.”354 Senior members 
of the INP see the potential of co-opting some members in an effort to de-radicalize the 
group and split the moderates away from the ultra-radicals and isolate the worse 
segments of the group.  
G. CONCLUSION 
This case study initially offers a very direct connection to the first hypothesis–that 
social movement organization has substantial utility to an insurgent group. In JI’s case, 
they have clearly reaped considerable mobilization benefits from their collaboration with 
a variety of social movement organizations and to a broader degree, their association with 
the radical Islamic social movement in general. JI’s intentional infiltration of the group 
FAKTA in Palembang, Sumatra, and the creation of MMI and JAT by JI members, 
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certainly suggests that JI sees the role of social movement organizations as extremely 
useful to its development. In many ways, the political opportunities that allowed JI to 
grow and expand in the late 1990s and early 2000s have now limited JI’s capacity as a 
standalone organization. Thus, the role that social movement organizations play is one of 
providing JI with leverage to take advantage of the new political opportunities in 
Indonesian and Southeast Asia.  
How does this case study assist in the examination of the utility of SMOs in the 
mobilization process? Before the 2002, Bali bombing JI had limited interest in SMOs or 
mobilization in general. However, the public reaction to the Bali bombing actually 
demobilized parts of JI because it gave the police legitimacy for repression in addition to 
causing potential sympathetic segments of the population to distance themselves from JI. 
Once JI increased its use of SMOs, JI and its SMOs were able to stop the police 
demobilization effectively and restart their mobilization process, as well as protect this 
mobilization process by the use of political pressure to hamper government repression. 
The second element of this thesis, the utility the state may draw in defeating the 
insurgency if it were to dismantle the insurgent’s sympathetic SMOs, can also be 
explored in this case study. It can be inferred that the JI leadership has determined that 
SMOs are the most efficient way to expand, and in this case, protect the insurgency. If 
the GOI were able to dismantle MMI and JAT, either through co-optation of more 
moderate members or through manipulation of existing political opportunities, then JI 
would lose its ability to appeal to its mass base and limit police repression of its 
underground activities. 
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VI. BATH INSURGENCY CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The next case study examined the Ba’athi Revolution in Iraq, an insurgency that 
started off with a somewhat high reliance on social movement organizations for its initial 
momentum but came to rely increasingly less and less on SMOs.  
How the Ba’athi movement successfully mobilized in order to overthrow the 
existing government is reviewed. Also analyzed is what the government did, or in some 
cases failed to do, to stop the mobilization of the movement. 
The history of the movement, beginning with the establishment of the Iraqi 
Republic following the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy is the first focus. Then, the 
movement in terms of social movement theory is framed. Lastly examined, in relation to 
the framing and social movement theory, is what actions the government took or should 
have taken to preclude a successful insurrection. 
The Ba’athist insurgency provides a good example of “within case variation.” The 
insurgency successfully used SMOs, political organizations, student unions, and 
professional trade unions, to achieve power. The insurgent leaders felt they no longer had 
to rely on these organizations and began to dissolve them. It is at this time that the 
movement ran into trouble and the insurgent regime was quickly deposed. 
B. BACKGROUND 
First, however, it is essential to study the history of the movement. 
Prior to 1958, Iraq was ruled by the Hashemite monarchy, dating back to its 






living had increased fivefold from 1939 to 1957 and 80% of the population was illiterate. 
Health care was plagued by a shortage of doctors, causing a rise in disease rates. No form 
of social security existed save for government bureaucrats.355  
With the establishment of the monarchy, Iraqi society had been almost completely 
restructured by the British.356 Seventy percent of farmable land in Iraq was divided 
between 3,400 tribal sheikhs; in addition, these tribal sheikhs were given almost 
unlimited power to rule their areas.357 As a result of this land redistribution, almost all of 
the remaining 3.8 million Iraqis did not own land.358 The average life expectancy for 
these peasants did not exceed 39 years.359 
Despite the poverty that most Iraqis lived under, an interesting phenomenon was 
occurring. A commercial and industrial faction was beginning to emerge from the 
bourgeoisie. By 1957, over 90,000 individuals were engaged in foreign and domestic 
trading and another 9,000 in real estate sales.360 However, 
the bourgeoisie as a whole was no match for the real powers in the 
country, namely the monarchy and its entourage, the great landowners, the 
Iraqi Petroleum Company, and British economic and military domination. 
In many ways . . . the grand bourgeoisie were as excluded from political 
power as the other strata of political power below them.361 
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The “other strata” consisted of a growing class of businessmen, doctors, teachers, 
civil servants. Students were also entering the workforce, looking for jobs in a tight 
economy. These masses of people represented the most educated of Iraqis and also the 
more likely to become nationalist and anti-imperialist.362 
A political system dominated by wealthy landowners and friends of the regime 
was quickly becoming out of touch with a growing Iraqi middle class. The Iraqi economy 
was growing with oil revenues and a more prosperous middle class was demanding 
greater political involvement and democratic rights. Furthermore, the government’s 
alignment with Western powers in the Baghdad Pact inflamed nationalist tensions. 
Demonstrations began to occur and the regime responded with harsh repression.363  
Emboldened by the Free Officers Movement in Egypt five years earlier, three 
banned opposition parties, the Ba’ath Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the National 
Democratic Party, formed the National Unity Front in Iraq in 1957.364 It took as its goal 
social and economic reform, addressing many of the common grievances against the 
current regime. Just as notable, the Front also captured the imaginations of many officers 
in the Iraqi military sympathetic to the Free Officers.  
The regime sensed a restless population and developed plans to share a greater 
portion of the oil revenues. However, the mechanisms for sharing, such as constructing 
irrigation canals, affected too few people to be of any value in calming tensions.365  
At around the same time, Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt, further 
inflaming tensions in Iraq. More protests and riots erupted.  
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A group of young officers began meeting secretly. Their intent was to execute an 
overthrow of the government and move Iraqi foreign policy in a more nationalistic 
direction.366 Led by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassem, the group was known as the Iraqi 
Free Officers.  
By now, events were unfolding in Iraq at a fevered pitch. On June 18, protesting 
the government, 4,000 demonstrators took to the streets in Diwaniyah; 43 were killed and 
over 500 were arrested by police. Paramilitary police were called in by the Prime 
Minister to quell the riots because he no longer had confidence in the army.367  
Three events occurred in early 1958, which gave the Iraqi Officers Movement the 
motivation to act.368 First, Egypt and Syria had formed an alliance, essentially bringing 
Nasser’s control to the border of Iraq. The Free Officers felt they could count on support 
from Nasser in the event of a coup. Second, the ongoing civil war in Lebanon had split 
the officer corps in their support of Iraqi foreign policy. Lastly, the declaration of an 
alliance between Iraq and Jordan gave the Free Officers the opportunity they had awaited. 
While the Prime Minister and senior army officers gathered to discuss the 
impending Iraqi-Jordanian alliance, the Free Officers began the coup. They seized control 
of the army and killed the Royal Family and Prime Minister.  
The Free Officers moved quickly to put a new government in place. Iraq was now 
ruled by a Revolutionary Council composed of army officers. Brigadier Qassem was the 
new Prime Minister. He immediately began implementing a series of political and 
economic policies. He withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, initiated land reform, 
revised the oil revenue sharing program, drafted a new constitution, started a housing 
program for low-income families, granted amnesty for political prisoners, and provided 
food subsidies.369 The new regime quickly gained the support of the Iraqi populace and 
cemented their status as the new government, thwarting any foreign military intervention. 
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However, the new government had an immediate problem of trying to maintain a 
coalition of nationalists and communists. The new government could not align itself too 
closely with the Egypt of Nasser for fear of losing the communists in the coalition. 
Qassem did not favor such an alliance either, fearing that his power would be usurped by 
Nasser.370 Nonetheless, the popular sentiment in Iraq was for such an alliance. 
Furthermore, most Iraqis did not want the radical economic reforms that would come 
with communism.  
In March of 1959, an army officer, Colonel al-Shawwaf, led a failed coup in 
Mosul. Al-Shawwaf was a Nasserist and supported union with Egypt.371 Qassem was 
able to suppress this revolt with help from the communists.372 However, in the fall of 
1959, Qassem took measure to strip power from the communists.373 This opened up 
political opportunities for the Ba’athists who were becoming increasingly frustrated with 
Qassem’s regime. In October, the Ba’athists attempted an unsuccessful assassination 
attempt against Qassem. In response, the regime became increasingly repressive. The 
government took over the trade unions and professional organizations of students, 
teachers, and lawyers. Qassem outlawed the communist party while at the same time 
dismissing Ba’athists and nationalists from his cabinet and from parliament. He 
effectively alienated himself politically from the right and the left.  
On February 8, 1963, the Ba’athists formed an alliance with other enemies of the 
regime, to include supporters of the monarchy, and toppled Qassem’s regime.  
The new Ba’athist regime began much more heavily repressive than did Qassem’s 
regime. Torture of the political opposition was commonplace. Communists were 
massacred.  
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Like Qassem’s regime, this new regime had infighting with which to deal as well. 
Ba’athists were split between nationalists who wanted to align more closely with Nasser 
and a more capitalistic bloc which wanted to promote industrialization and economic 
development.374  
Eventually, the more nationalistic forces won out when Abdul Salem Aref 
assumed power of the new republic and pursued a policy of nationalization of industry, 
aligning himself with Nasser. However, his government also began pursuing policies 
favorable to Western interests. For example, he privatized the Iraqi Petroleum Company, 
something Europe and the United States had long advocated.375  
Next, the Ba’athist movement is framed in terms of social movement theory and 
the components of social movement theory before and after 1958 analyzed. This period is 
significant because of the Ba’athist change in strategy. Prior to this time, the Ba’athists 
made effective use of the National Unity Front and various professional unions. After 
they assumed power, the Ba’athists turned on some of the very groups, such as the 
communists, that helped propel them to power, and were overthrown. 
C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
1. POS before 1958 
Looking at political opportunity structures, it is possible to see that the monarchy, 
unwittingly, created political opportunities for the Ba’athist movement. 
The regime inflamed nationalist sensibilities by entering into the Baghdad Pact, 
which brought Iraq into an alliance with Western powers. Then, the regime pledged 
military support to the Lebanese President, himself backed by Western powers, during 
the civil war in Lebanon. Iraq had both a growing Pan-Arabist movement and a growing 
middle class. These actions further mobilized both these groups against the regime. 
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Regime policies created political opportunities for other groups within the 
movement. The lack of any substantial oil revenue sharing was exploited by the 
communists to draw support for the movement. Similarly, the lack of any serious land 
reform was used by many in the movement to mobilize the burgeoning middle class. The 
regime failed to make the necessary political and economic reforms the populace was 
demanding, such as political inclusion and economic liberalization. When the regime 
finally made some attempts, the reforms were too feeble and too late. 
Finally, the overreaction of the regime to protests throughout the country created 
numerous political opportunities for the movement. The Diwaniyah massacre showed the 
populace the regime no longer had control of the Iraqi army and was not open to reform. 
2. POS after 1958 
After the fall of the regime, Qassem tried to change these political opportunities to 
his favor. 
First, he did enact the political and economic reforms that had mobilized the 
population against the monarchy. However, in the eyes of the nationalists and many in 
the middle class, he did not go far enough to align himself with Nasser’s Pan-Arabist 
movement. This opened up new political opportunities for the Ba’athists and nationalists. 
Second, he decreased communist representation in the parliament and repressed 
the communist movement. While this move was not necessarily unpopular with the 
populace, they would not have likely tolerated the economic reforms advocated by the 
communists, this did tilt the balance of power to the Ba’athists. 
D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
1. MS before 1958 
Next to be discussed are mobilizing structures. The main mobilizing structure was 
the army as it provided the best means of organizing, planning, and communicating. 
While the Iraqi army at this time was overly politicized relative to most Western armies, 
it provided the perfect mobilizing structure for the movement leadership. They could 
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easily recruit like-minded individuals, they had planning resources, they had access to 
necessary equipment and materiel, and they had influence over a large segment of 
society. 
The second main mobilizing structure was the National Unity Front. This 
coalition of political parties formed the main opposition to the regime. As already seen, it 
provided motivation to the Iraqi Free Officers. As its platform, it also captured many of 
the grievances of the population. 
The last mobilizing structure was the professional and political organizations. The 
communist parties had underground networks and clandestine newspapers.376 Students 
organized through student unions at the universities; lawyers, teachers, and doctors also 
mobilized through their respective professional organizations.377 For the rest of the 
middle class, they had access to not-yet-banned newspapers that described the excesses 
of the regime.378 
2. MS after 1958 
Rather than continuing to leverage these mobilizing structures, Qassem attempted 
to dismantle many of the same organizations that enabled him to seize power. He 
outlawed the communist party, removed Ba’athists from public office, and took control 
of professional and trade unions.  
Qassem’s repression of the communists was successful; the communist party 
dwindled in numbers and never again was a potent mobilizing structure.379 
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However, the Ba’athist party remained a very potent mobilizing structure. 
Beginning in 1961, they grew rapidly in numbers, taking control of key unions and 
crippling Baghdad with worker strikes.380 Before Qassem was toppled, the Ba’athists 
controlled almost all of Baghdad and vast areas of Iraq disposed to Pan-Arabism.381  
E. STRATEGIC FRAMES 
1. SF before 1958 
First examined is the diagnostic frame. According to the movement, the biggest 
problem was the regime’s overly accommodating policy to Western interests. This was at 
a time when nationalistic fervor was high throughout the Middle East. The regime 
certainly did not help matters by entering into the Baghdad Pact. 
Also part of the diagnostic frame was the lack of political and economic 
opportunity for much of the Iraqi middle class. Land and wealth was concentrated among 
the most powerful tribal and political leaders in Iraq. As the Iraqi economy grew from oil 
revenues, this disparity became even more apparent to the middle class. Political access 
was restricted to wealthy regime supporters. Many Iraqis saw social injustice but felt they 
had no way to rectify matters. 
Finally, the movement created a diagnostic frame in which the regime was overly 
repressive and denied citizens their civil rights. As anti-regime demonstrations grew 
across Iraq, the regime did respond in a very repressive manner, strengthening this frame.  
Now, for the prognostic frame. The movement certainly wanted to redirect Iraqi 
foreign policy away from advocating Western interests. Whether the movement was truly 
concerned about some of the other issues identified in the diagnostic frame is debatable. 
The movement most likely saw toppling the regime as the only way to change foreign 
policy. The regime was certainly never going to become sufficiently nationalistic for the 
Ba’athists.  
                                                 
380 Al-Khalil, “Republic of Fear: Politics of Modern Iraq,” 227. 
381 Ibid., 228. 
 102
The motivational frame was perhaps two-fold. First, by forming an alliance of 
varied interests (communists, trade unions, and professional associations), the Ba’athists 
were able to give some assurance that the social and economic problems facing the 
middle class would be addressed should the Ba’athists come to power. Second, the 
overreaction by the regime to protests throughout Iraq impressed upon the populace that 
the regime had to go. Therefore, the Ba’athist movement represented the best vehicle for 
this.  
2. State Response 
Now that the Ba’athist movement has been framed in terms of social movement 
theory, it is easier, therefore, to see what the government did to demobilize the movement 
and why this was unsuccessful.  
In 1957, sensitive to mounting tensions, the regime did initiate a program to 
increase oil revenue sharing. This program probably would have had some success in 
defusing the movement. However, it was lacking in its implementation. For example, 
some of the shared revenues went to increasing irrigation throughout the country with the 
intent to serve poor farmers better. Whatever the intended effect, the improved irrigation 
ended up benefiting wealthy landowners the most, likely further escalating tensions 
between the middle class and the regime.  
This tactic had four intended effects. First, it intended to modify part of the 
diagnostic frame. By sharing more of the oil revenues with the population, this would 
nullify one of the grievances. Second, this tactic also intended to modify the prognostic 
frame. If the population felt they were receiving adequate basic services from the regime, 
they would be less likely to advocate regime change. Following this logic, the 
motivational frame would be weakened as well. Lastly, this tactic hoped to shift some 
political opportunities that favored the movement to opportunities that favored the 
regime. Again, however, because of poor implementation, none of these effects was ever 
achieved. 
Another tactic the regime used was repression. This might have been an effective 
tactic, but the regime used it indiscriminately. Had the regime made better use of this 
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tactic and gone solely after movement leaders, both communists and Ba’athists, they 
might have been able to demobilize the movement. Thus, by repressing students, 
teachers, and workers, the regime helped to mobilize the movement further.382 
This tactic intended to affect both the motivational frame and the mobilizing 
structures. By severely repressing protestors, the regime hoped to make the cost of 
contention too high in the eyes of the movement. Furthermore, the pressure put on the 
movement would cause the movement members to abandon their current mobilizing 
structures and seek more clandestine, underground means of mobilizing. This might have 
worked had the repression been selective. However, because of the repression’s 
indiscriminate nature, the repression had the effect of strengthening the movement as 
more and more of the population came to see the regime as oppressive. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Ba’athi insurgency initially made effective use of social movement 
organizations to mobilize the populace. However, it was when the first movement leader, 
and subsequent Prime Minister, Abdul Karim Qassem began to dismantle the very 
movements that propelled him to power, that he lost power and was overthrown. He 
became excessively repressive, like the former regime. He no longer relied upon the most 
effective means of mobilizing, SMOs, and instead relied on the least effective means, 
coercion.  
This case examined the effectiveness of an SMO to mobilize the population. As a 
counterpoint, also shown was how the leadership of an insurgency can fail when they do 
not make effective use of an SMO; in this case, the leadership even attempted to 
demobilize the SMO. The next chapter analyzes a very similar insurgency that initially 
made very effective use of an SMO, but then saw their movement falter when they began 
to concentrate on coercion at the expense of leveraging SMOs.  
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VII. SUNNI INSURGENCY CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Sunni insurgency began in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This 
insurgency had two components: a component that wanted a return to Ba’athism and to 
the rule of Saddam Hussein, and another component that saw an opportunity to promote a 
fundamentalist, radical interpretation of Islam in the power vacuum left by the collapse of 
the Hussein regime. In both cases, the principal adversaries of this insurgency were the 
Coalition Forces that toppled the former regime and the newly established Iraqi 
government and security forces.  
The insurgency reached its zenith in 2006, just prior to a change in 
counterinsurgency strategy and tactics by Coalition Forces. The insurgency, which had so 
successfully mobilized the population through the existing Iraqi tribal structures, failed to 
maintain its mobilization capacity. 
This case study sees “within case variation”—the insurgency initially used social 
movement organizations fairly effectively. However, as Coalition Forces strategy and 
tactics changed, the insurgency relied less on SMOs and more on coercion to achieve its 
aims.  
As in the previous case studies, the insurgency, look at how it has attempted to 
mobilize the Iraqi Sunni populace, and what the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces 
have done to demobilize this movement and defeat this insurgency are framed. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Sunni insurgency is largely composed of two main groups, Iraqi Nationalists 
and Sunni Islamists.383 
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The Iraqi Nationalists count former regime loyalists and Ba’athists among their 
members. Prior to the capture of Saddam Hussein, the goal of this group was the 
restoration to power of Saddam Hussein. Now the goal is simply to restore the Ba’ath 
party to power. Some members have sought to pursue this through politics–the Ba’athists 
have formed a legitimate political party in Iraq–while others have left to join Islamist 
insurgent groups.384 The Iraqi nationalists are motivated mainly by their loss of power, 
prestige, and wealth.385 To compound this further, the nationalists fear marginalization 
within Iraqi politics.386 Despite being in the minority, the Sunni had representation 
beyond their numbers in government under the Saddam Hussein regime. Now they face a 
new government in which power must be shared and even risk under-representation. 
The composition of the Sunni Islamists is a bit more complex. The Sunni 
Islamists are made up of both local and international Islamist groups, the most famous 
being Al Qaeda. These groups are much less restrained than the Ba’athists and do not 
necessarily favor a return of the former regime; in fact, these groups are willing to, and 
have tried to, provoke civil war within the country.387 They seek a society governed by a 
strict interpretation of Islam–to this end, they have declared the Islamic State of Iraq.388  
The history of both these factions and how they rose to prominence following the 
war in Iraq is discussed next. 
The insurgency in Iraq began almost immediately following the U.S. invasion of 
March 2003. Perhaps the insurgency was part of Saddam Hussein’s defense plan—well-
trained Fedayeen fighters would “go to ground” and later rise up to fight the conquering  
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Coalition Forces.389 More than likely, the insurgency began in the vacuum that was 
created when the regime was toppled. The U.S. had no real plan for governance or 
reconstruction and the nation quickly descended into chaos.390 
The summer following the invasion saw the first real signs of any insurgency. 
Initially, the insurgency was mostly characterized by Ba’athists and former members of 
the Iraqi Republican Guard and Fedayeen.391 The goal of the insurgency during these 
early months was the restoration of the Saddam regime.392 
It was not until November 2003 that ideological splits could be seen forming in 
the movement. To be sure, a portion of the insurgents still favored the return of Saddam 
Hussein to power. However, other, more diverse movements were forming; the 
movements, while Sunni, were also more fundamentally Islamic in nature.393  
To the Islamists, Iraq represented an opportunity, much like Afghanistan in 1979 
or Bosnia in the 1990s, for jihad.394 Native Sunnis and foreign fighters began streaming 
into the country; attack levels against Coalition Forces quadrupled from what they had 
been over the summer of 2003.395  
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was first established as Tawhid wal Jihad by Abu Musab 
Al Zarqawi, who recognized the opportunity presented by the toppling of the former 
regime.396 In 2004, Zarqawi aligned himself with Al Qaeda and received their tentative 
endorsement, “tentative” because the Al Qaeda leadership was worried about Zarqawi’s 
seemingly indiscriminate killing of Iraqi civilians.397  
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Zarqawi saw Sunni tribes as natural allies of his movement. As a response to 
economic sanctions during Saddam Hussein’s regime, tribalism had risen in Sunni areas 
of Iraq as the central government was less and less able to exert control.398 To maintain 
tribal allegiances, Saddam Hussein offered generous incentives to the tribes, incentives 
that ended with the fall of the regime.399 This, coupled with a now enfranchised majority 
Shi’a population, made Al Qaeda and the Sunni tribes logical allies.400 
However, the pace of events in Iraq surprised the Islamists. They saw a new 
government beginning to form and elections scheduled. Greater and greater numbers of 
Sunni were opting to participate with the new government of Iraq. Abu Musab Al 
Zarqawi issued a threat on the eve of the first elections in Iraq: anyone voting in the 
elections would face death.401 The Iraqi Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars publicly 
rebuked him. Splits were already forming between Iraqi and foreign Islamists. 
In 2005, a schism began to form between the Sunni tribes and Al Qaeda.402 
Coalition Forces strategists observed this schism and began developing strategies to 
exploit it.403 Coalition Forces saw an opportunity to begin developing alliances with 
Sunni tribal leaders. Sunni tribal leaders also saw an opportunity; while fearful of Shia 
domination and still hostile to the U.S. presence, the tribes saw AQI as their more 
immediate and threatening enemy.404 Coalition Forces began funding, supplying, and 
augmenting Sunni tribal militates with combat power.405 
 
                                                 




402 It is this schism, the authors argue, that was identified and exploited by Coalition Force strategists 
in the 2007 change in strategy and tactics, commonly referred to as “The Surge.” 
403 Phillips, “How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq,” 1, Google Scholar database, 77. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid., 78. 
 109
In October 2006, AQI announced an Islamic State of Iraq in Ramadi.406 This 
attempt by AQI to exert control over an Iraqi Province and put an Iraqi face on their 
domination backfired. The Sunni tribes had already turned against AQI. Now, even Sunni 
Iraqi insurgent groups turned against AQI and established a competing coalition.407 
Now that the components of the Sunni insurgency and its history have been 
examined, the movement in terms of modern social movement theory is described next. 
Just as in the previous case studies, the movement is framed in terms of political 
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and strategic frames. The authors examine 
these components both before and after the AQI/Sunni tribe schism. 
C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES (POS) 
1. POS before Schism 
The first element of POS available to the Sunni insurgency was the political 
vacuum created by the collapse of the Ba’athist regime.408 For the Ba’athist component 
of the Sunni insurgency, this vacuum represented an opportunity to restore at least the 
Ba’ath party to power. For the Sunni Islamists, this vacuum offered an opportunity to 
further jihad in Afghanistan and attempt to establish a Caliphate in Iraq.409 
The second element of POS is the seeming congruence of aims and objectives 
between the disenfranchised Sunni population and AQI. Both groups favored the 
expulsion of Coalition Forces and rejected the newly established Shia-dominated 
government. It makes sense that the two groups saw each other as natural allies.  
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2. POS after Schism 
The change in Coalition Force strategy and tactics eroded the political 
opportunities the Sunni insurgency enjoyed prior to 2007.  
To be sure, the power vacuum that existed with the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime had yet to be completely filled. However, opportunities were not what they were. 
A representative Iraqi government had been stood up after national elections in 2005. 
Sunnis did not participate in these elections, but did participate in large numbers (75-
85%)410 later that year when Iraqis approved their new constitution. This suggests that 
Sunnis were becoming increasingly politically involved and increasingly saw 
participation in the political process as a means to achieve their aims. 
It also became apparent to the Sunnis that their aims and AQI’s aims were not as 
congruent as once believed. Further, similarities in aims and enemies could no longer 
excuse differences or AQI’s overbearing nature. The Sunni population still wanted to 
expel Coalition Forces and still disliked the Iraqi central government. However, they saw 
working through the political system as the way to achieve this best. When AQI decreed 
that elections were un-Islamic and punished the population for voting and a number of 
other minor infractions, the population became resentful.411 AQI had now become the 
more serious threat to the Sunni population, and they were able to form common cause 
with Coalition Forces. 
D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES (MS) 
1. MS before Schism 
Prior to 2007, the Sunni insurgency had three main mobilizing structures. The 
first structure was the officer corps of the disbanded Iraqi Army. Predominantly Sunni, 
these officers found themselves without employment but with a vast network of military 
training and experience. 
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The second structure was the Sunni tribes. For the Sunni Islamist insurgents, 
particularly foreign fighters, these tribes provided a support structure. An Al Qaeda 
strategy used in the Balkans and Afghanistan was to align themselves with key tribes, 
intermarry with tribal members, and co-opt the tribes’ power and influence.412 The 
powerful Albu Nasir tribe, the tribe of many of the Ba’ath party inner circle, was an early 
supporter of Al Qaeda.413 In the Sunni Triangle, the Hussein, Al Douri, Hadouthi, 
Masliyat, Hassan, and Harimyth tribes, to name a few, coordinated and supported Al 
Qaeda.414 
Lastly, the Ba’athist Sunni insurgency was a mobilizing structure for the Islamist 
insurgents. By aligning causes, AQI believed they could work together with the Ba’athist 
insurgency. Also, through actions such as declaring certain regions Islamic States of Iraq 
and through coercion, the Islamists believed they could commandeer the Ba’athist 
insurgency, leveraging their organization and experience to support the Islamist cause.415 
2. MS after Schism 
These mobilizing structures changed as a result of Sunni tribal disaffection and 
shifts in Coalition Force strategy.  
AQI sought to remake Sunni as a Caliphate according to its own strict social and 
religious interpretation of Islam. AQI’s social and religious strictures often ran counter to 
customs and traditions of the tribes.416 As the tribes resisted, AQI became increasingly 
violent, further alienating the tribes and exacerbating the schism. 
Phillips identifies three factors that contributed to the insurgency losing the Sunni 
tribes as a mobilizing structure. First, Al Qaeda operatives began intermarrying into 
Sunni tribal families. This standard Al Qaeda practice went against Iraqi tribal customs, 
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erupting into violence between the tribes and AQI. Second, AQI became black market 
economic competitors to the Sunni tribes. With remittances no longer coming from 
Baghdad, the tribes relied on black market activity as a significant source of income, a 
source that was being usurped by Al Qaeda. Finally, AQI tried to impose a very 
fundamentalist Islamic interpretation on the social and political structure of the tribes. 
The tribes resented the standards of conduct being imposed upon them. In the case of the 
2005 election boycott, they resented being forced to act in a manner inconsistent with 
what they saw as their political best interest. 
The Dulaimi tribe is one such tribe that became disenchanted with AQI. Located 
in Anbar Province, the tribe provided support to Al Qaeda initially.417 The tribe grew to 
resent the influx of foreign fighters into their tribal areas. In May 2005, the tribe entered 
into a coalition with other tribes to combat AQI.418 
AQI’s overbearing nature also alienated the Albu Fahd tribe in Ramadi.419 The 
tribe split with AQI in late 2005, and by early 2006, the tribe was cooperating with 
Coalition Forces and engaged in fighting with Al Qaeda. 
E. STRATEGIC FRAMES (SF) 
1. SF before Schism 
Both components of the Sunni insurgency, the nationalists and the Islamists, have 
the same diagnostic frame. U.S. occupation of Iraq is seen as the problem.  
However, the diagnostic frame for the Islamists is a little deeper. While the frame 
for the nationalists ended at the U.S. occupation, for the Islamists, it is really just a 
beginning. The Islamists see non-Islamic governments, or governments deemed too 
friendly to Western or non-Muslim interests, as the problem. Had the invasion of Iraq  
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never occurred, the nationalists would have little need to mobilize. However, for the 
Islamists, they were mobilizing in response to non-Muslim governments many years 
prior. 
For the prognostic frame, the two camps begin truly to differ. The nationalists still 
see the solution as restoration to power of the Ba’ath party. The Islamists see the solution 
as the establishment of a caliphate that applies a strict interpretation of Islam to its 
governance and laws. 
2. SF after Schism 
The Ba’athists insurgents still favor a return to power, but, many now see the 
current political system as their best opportunity to achieve this. 
The Islamists still desire to establish a caliphate in Iraq. They have tried to put an 
Iraqi face on their operations by attempting to co-opt indigenous Islamists groups, but 
these efforts have been unsuccessful. AQI’s strategic frame no longer resonates, partly 
because of its own over-aggressiveness, but also due to Coalition Force alliances with 
Sunni tribes. AQI does not seem to have modified its strategic frames in light of these 
new realities. 
3. State Response 
Next to be examined is some of the means the U.S.-led Coalition has used to 
demobilize these movements as well as the effectiveness and ascertain why these means 
have or have not been effective based upon the framework just developed.  
Although the Coalition Forces have initiated numerous programs and policies in 
Iraq, the authors explore perhaps the three most controversial policies, the “wall surge,” 





Accompanying the surge in troops, Coalition Forces embarked on a large-scale 
project throughout Iraq to wall off warring ethnic factions from one another. Most 
notably in Baghdad, the walls separate 11 different Sunni and Shi’a sections of the 
city.420 This policy has been controversial mainly because it derives more from Israeli 
lessons learned in Palestine than the counterinsurgency theory so much in vogue.421  
This policy can be an effective mechanism for attacking mobilizing structures. A 
series of walls and checkpoints can make it difficult for groups to maintain networks, to 
meet, and to mobilize. However, Israel, who developed this policy, has had little success 
disrupting the terror networks within Palestine—in fact, the number of terror groups and 
severity of terror attacks increased following implementation of this policy.422 
Also, this policy does nothing to modify strategic framing. In fact, Iraqi resistance 
to this policy (they see themselves as becoming another Palestine)423 may strengthen the 
diagnostic frame. 
This policy also creates new and stronger political opportunities for the 
insurgency. The insurgents can seize on and exploit Iraqi objections to the policy.  
It is difficult to say precisely if this policy is working or has failed. Attack levels 
in Baghdad are down,424 but this could easily be the result of other concurrent policies. 
Nonetheless, based upon the social movement theory framework for the insurgency, it is 
reasonable to conclude that this policy will not be an effective long-term strategy as it 
does nothing to address strategic frames and may very well create political opportunities 
for the insurgency. 
Next, the Sons of Iraq are examined. In exchange for their cooperation and 
assistance, Sunni tribes in Iraq were paid by the Coalition to provide security within their 
tribal areas. Under the agreement, tribes provide and equip their own security forces. 
                                                 
420 Steve Niva, “Walling off Iraq: Israel’s Imprint on U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Middle East 
Policy (Fall 2008): 1, Google Proquest database. 
421 Ibid., 3. 
422 Ibid., 12.  
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid., 1. 
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These forces are responsible for ensuring security and combating the insurgency within 
their tribal areas. In essence, this policy is turning insurgents into allies.425 Of the 31 
Sunni tribes in Anbar Province, 25 are now aligned with Coalition Forces.426 AQI no 
longer has a base of support or mobilization upon which to rely. According to Sheikh 
Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, an Anbar tribal leader, a force of 1,300 insurgents is now up 
against a tribal militia of 30,000.427 
This policy does much to modify strategic framing. For the nationalists, the 
diagnostic and prognostic frames are shifted. Certainly, the nationalists still want to 
restore the Ba’athist party to power. However, the nationalists are now likely to see the 
expulsion of Coalition Forces secondary to defeat of the Islamists—once the Islamists are 
defeated, Coalition Forces may leave on their own accord. Plus, the nationalists are now 
benefitting from Coalition Force presence. 
Mobilizing structures are also affected. The tribes know their respective areas 
better than Coalition Forces possibly can. They know where insurgents congregate to 
plan and to mobilize. Now charged with securing their areas, the tribes are in a better 
position than Coalition Forces to combat insurgents. 
Lastly, this policy also affects political opportunities. The policy is still too new to 
determine, but the tribes now likely feel more a part of the political process and more 
likely to participate. 
Thus, it can be seen that, based upon this framework, this policy should be 
effective. It is perhaps impossible to attribute any declines in violence to this policy, but 
it is a prudent policy nonetheless. 
Finally, the policy of reconciliation is investigated. Commonly known as the 
“benchmarks,” reconciliation is the term for a broad set of legislative measures designed 
to ease Sunni and Kurdish concerns over inclusion in the new Iraqi government. Oil 
                                                 
425 Steven Simon, “The Price of the Surge,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2008): 3, Google Scholar 
database.  
426 Anthony Cordesman, “Iraq Force Development: Conditions for Success, Consequences of 
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revenue sharing, de-Ba’athification, election law reform, integration of the security 
forces, and a provincial powers act are just some of the legislative measures Coalition 
Forces would like the Iraqi parliament to enact.428 
A successful program of reconciliation does affect the prognostic and 
motivational frames for the nationalist component of the Sunni insurgency. As the 
government becomes more responsive and representative of the Sunni minority, the 
nationalists lose their ability to recruit among the population. More nationalists may feel 
they can work within the system to achieve their aims.  
This policy does not greatly affect mobilizing structures, but for reasons already 
stated, this policy creates new political opportunities. These political opportunities are not 
favorable to the insurgents; rather, these opportunities help to demobilize further the 
insurgency as movement members see less risk and possibly more reward working 
through the political process. In addition, the insurgent goals may in fact be modified as 
movement members increasingly see a government both fair and responsive. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Sunni Insurgency initially made effective use of social movement 
organizations to mobilize the Sunni populace. However, when they began to rely heavily 
on coercion to compel support from the Iraqi populace, they began to lose the support of 
Iraqi Sunnis. Insurgents have perpetrated violence on Iraqis participating in elections, 
Iraqis who have joined security forces, and Iraqis who help or support the new 
government in any way.429 Also, this violence is not without its operational goals and 
objectives. Nonetheless, almost six years later, the insurgency has not made significant 
strides. In fact, the insurgency may even be losing ground. However, this is to be  
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expected. As seen in Chapter II, coercion is the least effective means of mobilizing a 
population. Yet, it is upon this technique that the Sunni insurgency now almost 
exclusively relies.  
The more effective techniques to mobilize a population, persuasion and use of a 
social movement organization, could be used effectively by the insurgency. The fledgling 
Iraqi government still has difficulties providing basic services to certain areas of the 
country; the insurgency could easily leverage this and take up the role of providing these 
basic services, as the Mahdi army has done in parts of Iraq. The Sunni insurgency could 
exploit these political opportunities, but they have not adapted their organization to these 
new realities. The insurgency has instead pursued a less effective means of mobilizing the 
population. As a result, the insurgency has been unsuccessful to date, and 
counterinsurgents have begun successfully counter-mobilizing the population. 
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This thesis began with two questions. First, is the use of a social movement 
organization (SMO) by an insurgency an effective method to mobilize a population? To 
expand on this question, is the use of a social movement organization to mobilize a more 
efficient method than coercion or persuasion? Second, if an insurgency can successfully 
use an SMO to mobilize a population, can the state then decrease the insurgency’s ability 
to mobilize by diminishing the effectiveness of the SMO? More importantly, is it 
productive for the counterinsurgent to employ a strategy that weakens the SMO in this 
case? This chapter reexamines these questions and discusses methods based upon the 
thesis research that the counterinsurgent can use to neutralize an insurgency relying on 
SMOs to mobilize the population. 
Four cases were examined in this thesis and based upon which it sought to answer 
the two questions. The cases and the findings are summarized below. 
B. CASE STUDIES AND FINDINGS 
1. Darul Islam 
The DI insurgency used the MUI as an SMO with which they organized and 
mobilized the population of rural West Java to resist the influence of the government of 
Indonesia (GOI). The MUI, the Suffah institute, and the MASYUMI militias eventually 
formed the civil and military administration of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in 
West Java. The use of SMOs allowed the insurgency to mobilize the population 
successfully to a sufficient level to resist the influence of the GOI from 1948 until 1958. 
DI’s social movement organizations had transformed into a semi-government body once 
it had displaced all GOI influence from the political space. 
In the face of a reinvigorated GOI strategy, DI selected a mobilization method of 
coercion over a reinvigoration of the SMOs. DI’s coercive strategy without the support of 
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their former SMOs tended to isolate DI’s military and civilian members. Once the GOI 
began forming their own SMOs to assist in village defense and development, then the 
DI’s coercion strategy exacerbated their loss of legitimacy and encouraged the GOI’s 
gain and the DI’s loss of political space.  
The DI gained considerable advantage from 1948 to 1958 using an SMO but 
quickly lost this advantage when the state effectively demobilized the DI SMOs and then 
counter-mobilized the population with their own SMOs. These empirical data indicate 
that DI’s use of SMOs did offer them a greater efficiency than the use of coercion, and on 
the other camp, the same lack of advantage in using coercion is found as well: the GOI 
strategy of incidental coercion (reactive military actions and threats and harassment of the 
population) has little success against the DI but once they shifted their strategy in 1957, 
then afterwards, their use of SMOs became a very efficient mobilization method. 
2. Jemaah Islamiyah 
Jemaah Islamiyah initially developed as a small secret organization without any 
desire to utilize any public SMOs. However, the openness of the political system in 
Indonesia after the fall of Suharto combined with the selected and efficient police 
repression of the “pro-bombing” faction of JI and possibly the successful example 
demonstrated by other public Islamic militant groups encourage JI to reexamine its 
strategy. 
Once JI members created MMI and later JAT, these SMOs offered JI continued 
access to the population. This was a mechanism through which they organized and 
planned without the fear of government repression, a system with which they accessed 
domestic and foreign resources, and a method with which they built popular support and 
leveraged that popular support in the form of political pressure against Indonesian 
national and local governments. 
The Indonesian government has, so far, had limited success in limiting the utility 
of JI’s use of SMOs. While effective GOI repression of the operational cells of JI have 
shown tremendous success and the GOIs counter-ideology efforts have also shown 
promise with incarcerated JI members, the lack of a plan to narrow the broad political 
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opportunities available to JI are a glaring strategic shortfall. The GOI’s success in 
selective repression of terror cells combined with their lack of focus on political 
opportunities available to JI’s SMOs have encouraged JI to increase its dependence and 
utilization of these SMOs. 
3. Ba’athist Insurgency 
The Ba’athist insurgency made effective use of political alliances, trade unions, 
student unions, and the Iraqi Army to overthrow the monarchy of Iraq. These SMOs 
captured the energy of a disaffected middle class and channeled these energies into 
regime change. When the monarchy responded with indiscriminate repression, these 
SMOs were able to mobilize the population further. Furthermore, coercion by the regime, 
in terms of political concessions, did little to keep the population from mobilizing. 
Once the Ba’athists had assumed power, the new regime ignored the same SMOs 
that had propelled the regime to power. It tried ineffectively to demobilize these 
movements. Political policies and decisions served to mobilize these movements further, 
resulting in the eventual overthrow of the regime and its replacement by another regime 
more acceptable to the Ba’athist insurgents. 
This case illustrates the effectiveness of social movement organizations when 
used properly by insurgents to mobilize the population. The case also demonstrates the 
relative ineffectiveness of coercion and repression as mobilization techniques.   
4.  The Sunni Insurgency 
The Sunni insurgency initially made effective use of the Iraqi tribes as an SMO in 
their fight against the Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces. Due to common aims, Al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Sunni tribes were natural allies. For AQI, the Sunni tribes 




Over time, AQI became increasingly repressive to mobilize the populace. This 
had the effect of alienating the Sunni tribes and depriving AQI of its support. At the same 
time, Coalition Forces reached out to the Sunni tribes with financial and military support. 
AQI’s one-time supporter aligned with Coalition Forces and openly fought against the 
insurgent organization. 
This case illustrates the comparative values of the three mobilization techniques 
discussed in Chapter III: SMO, coercion, and persuasion. As AQI was practicing 
repression on the Sunni populace, Coalition Forces used persuasion to greater success. 
Moreover, once the Sunni tribes transformed into an SMO of sorts, mobilized in support 
of Coalition Forces, AQI had lost much of its effectiveness in the region. 
The cases were selected for homogeneity of the independent variable while 
providing maximum variation of the dependent variables. Table 3 illustrates a useful 
construct for viewing these cases and seeing how they fit within this research. 
 
Table 3.   Case Study Construct 
This table depicts four quadrants. “Demobilization of SMO” refers to the 
counterinsurgent’s abilities and capabilities to demobilize the social movement 
organization. “Insurgent’s reliance on SMO” refers to the degree to which the health of  
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the insurgency is dependent on the sympathetic social movement. “Effective” and 
“ineffective” refer to how successful the counterinsurgent will be in demobilizing the 
sympathetic social movement.  
Note that in quadrant 1, a counterinsurgent effort is likely to be unsuccessful. Yes, 
the insurgent relies highly on the sympathetic social movement, but the state has very 
little capability to demobilize the social movement. The state can still have a chance to 
wage a successful counterinsurgency, but it will not be successful by targeting the social 
movement; the state must look to other strategies. 
Quadrant 2 is optimal for the insurgent: he does not require a sympathetic social 
movement for support, and the state has little ability to demobilize the social movement. 
By contrast, this is the least favorable quadrant for the state. The state must increase its  
ability vastly to demobilize the insurgents’ sympathetic social movement. Even then, 
such an increase may only incrementally improve the state’s chance of success since the 
insurgency relies little on the social movement. 
In quadrant 3, the state is favored to some extent. Although the insurgent does not 
rely heavily on the social movement, the state’s capability to demobilize the social 
movement is high.  
The counterinsurgent can be most successful in quadrant 4, where he has 
maximum ability to demobilize the social movement organization and the insurgent is 
most reliant on this social organization.  
In each of the cases, this thesis examined the SMO used by the insurgency moved 
between quadrants over the course of the conflict. This is shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Positioning of Cases within the Construct 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) started as a terrorist organization focused on large-scale 
attacks but with no plan or ability to build popular support or engage SMOs. After the 
Bali bombing in 2002, effective state repression destroyed much of the JI organization. JI 
was forced to begin building popular support and make use of SMOs. 
Darul Islam (DI) started as a movement highly dependent on SMOs. However, the 
state eventually recognized this and developed a strategy to demobilize the SMO and 
counter mobilize the population. 
During its lifecycle, the Sunni insurgency (SI) has occupied several quadrants. 
Initially, both the Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces had little ability to demobilize 
the insurgency. Further, the insurgency drew on support from the populace. Over time, 
however, the state has been more and more successful at exploiting AQI excesses and 
using these excesses to divide the insurgency. As this has occurred, the insurgency has 




Lastly, the Ba’athist insurgency benefited from a state that had neither the 
capacity nor the expertise to attempt to demobilize it. The insurgency required less 
support over time as it took control of the state apparatus and seized control of the 
military. 
The four case studies will demonstrate “within case” variation. Each insurgency 
made use of an SMO in addition to other methods of mobilization. The case studies will 
examine how effective each insurgency was when using different methods of 
mobilization. Within a case, the effectiveness rates will be compared and contrasted.  
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
AND USING SMT 
These findings have certain practical applications to the counterinsurgent. This 
section will present policy recommendations, extrapolated from the case studies, to the 
state dealing with an insurgency. This section also discusses how these recommendations 
can be operationalized. Each recommendation has certain parameters and limits to its 
effectiveness. These limitations are also discussed. 
1. Concept of Mobilization Demobilization and Counter Mobilization 
The empirical evidence in all four case studies support the initial analysis of the 
existing COIN literature–the counterinsurgents task is to stop the insurgent’s ability to 
mobilize and increase the state’s ability to mobilize–not simply to seek methods to gain 
public affection. The concepts of mobilization, demobilization, and counter mobilization 




population.430 In the Darul Islam case, actions taken by the state to first demobilize the 
population supporting DI and later to counter mobilize the population offer distinct 
phases for analysis.  
For future COIN strategy, developing a clear delineation of efforts to demobilize 
and counter-mobilize the population are necessary as part of a complete strategy. Actions 
designed to win the support of the population without consideration of mobilization will 
fall short of success.431 
2. Counter Mobilization through Building State Sympathetic SMOs 
One of the most effective actions apparent in the empirical case studies is that of 
constructing an SMO sympathetic to the state. In the case of the DI insurgency, the state 
organized security and development SMOs at the village level. This allowed the state to 
counter mobilize the population thus reaping the benefits of using an SMO as a 
mobilization tool while detracting support for the insurgents SMOs. Since the state has 
greater resources, they can insure their sponsored SMOs are more effective. Again, in the 
DI insurgency, the TNI used its resources to assist in village development and security 
SMOs, and thus, making them more attractive to the population. 
The application of this concept can be fairly straightforward in the areas of 
conflict. The state can organize the local population to address grievances that the 
population has identified. The essential element of this concept is that although the state  
 
                                                 
430 To remind the reader that the definition for mobilization used in his thesis is the process by which a 
group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life. 
Demobilization is thus the reverse process, when individuals shift back to a passive state of being. Counter-
mobilization is the process a group goes through when its political mobilization is realigned. It may be 
helpful to think of this from the point of view of the insurgency: whereas demobilization is a neutral 
position, mobilization is a positive position and counter-mobilization is a negative position actively moving 
away from the insurgency and closer to the state (or vice versa if looking at the definitions from the state’s 
point of view). See Chapter II for an examination of mobilization. 
431 As an example of activities that rely on building popular affection without mobilization, the U.S. 
military frequently conducts medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs) in support of counterinsurgency 
or stability operations. In some cases, the MEDCAPs are conducted with primarily U.S. doctors designed to 
target acute medical problems. These types of activities–if conducted without local engagement–follow up 
treatment plans, local medical capacity building and the active participation of the community usually fall 
short as a tool for mobilization.  
 127
supports the SMO, it must be generally a locally run organization. If the state fails to 
leverage the local population and addresses the grievances without local participation, it 
will not be successful.432 
One obvious caveat is the danger of a local SMO that gains popularity and begins 
to make claims against the state outside of the boundaries that the state has created. In 
many cases, states have created local militias that have grown into uncontrollable local 
armies abusing the populations they were designed to protect. It is difficult to imagine a 
purely developmental SMO metastasizing into a violent uncontrollable militia but it 
could become a challenger to state influence. 
3. Comprehensive Demobilization 
Demobilization requires a comprehensive effort to address all three facets of 
social movement theory: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and strategic 
frames. Often, counterinsurgency efforts concentrate exclusively on strategic frames, if 
only the population’s grievances can be redressed, the population loses its motivation to 
mobilize. Such a limited approach is inefficient at best.  
However, more than inefficient, such an emphasis on strategic framing to the 
exclusion of political opportunities and mobilizing structures can be disastrous to the 
counterinsurgent. This is best illustrated by the Iraqi monarchy’s response to growing 
unrest. The monarchy enacted limited reforms to appease the populace, but did little to 
address the mobilizing structures that would empower the movement that ultimately 
toppled the monarchy. In Jemaah Islamiyah’s case, the state has developed effective 
strategies to counter JI’s strategic frames as well as some of its mobilizing structures; 
however, the state has taken no significant action to counter the political opportunities 
available to JI. This has allowed JI to survive and maintain its claim on legitimacy and 
political space through its use of the MMI and JAT SMOs. 
                                                 
432 One example of a state supported SMO is the area coordinating council (ACC) system in the 
Republic of the Philippines. In the Sulu province in the southern Philippines, the provincial government 
established an ACC in all 18 municipalities in Sulu. These ACCs are collective organizations comprised of 
fishermen, businessmen, religious groups, NGOs and women’s groups that have a vested interest in the 
development of their community. These ACCs operate within state created guidelines and bring claims 
against the state to facilitate the development of the community. 
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To be sure, addressing strategic framing is an important component of an 
effective COIN strategy. However, the strategy has to be comprehensive and address 
political opportunities and mobilizing structures. The state must first look at mobilizing 
structures. The state must identify these structures and become familiar with their 
organization and operation. From where do these structures draw their support? How are 
they organized? Are there any weaknesses or point of possible exploitation in the 
structures? Once the mobilizing structures are understood, the state can devise strategies 
to weaken them. As discussed above, the state can also create competing SMOs with 
competing mobilizing structures.  
The counterinsurgent must also examine existing political opportunities. What 
political opportunities favor the insurgency and can the state manipulate conditions to 
nullify or reverse these opportunities? What actions can the state take to produce political 
opportunities injurious to the insurgency?  
Just as it is dangerous for the counterinsurgent to concentrate too much on 
strategic frames, it would be equally dangerous to develop a strategy that concentrates 
inordinately on political opportunities or mobilizing structures. The counterinsurgent 
should use a balanced, comprehensive approach that takes into account all three 
components of social movement theory and how these components interact and influence 
each other. 
4. Demobilization through an Amnesty Program 
A properly incentivized amnesty program can be a very effective technique in a 
counterinsurgency. Such a program decreases the friction along the demobilization path, 
making it easier and more lucrative for the insurgent to cease his support for the 
insurgency. The Sons of Iraq program used by the Coalition Forces in Iraq can be 
considered just such a program. In exchange for abandoning the Sunni insurgency, 
Coalition Forces rewarded Sunni tribes with money and weaponry. This program was so 
well devised the tribes not only left the insurgency but also began actively combating the 
insurgency in which they formerly supported. In this case, the counterinsurgent had a  
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comparative advantage in resources to exploit existing mobilizing structures. While this 
comparative advantage is not a necessary condition, it does greatly assist the 
counterinsurgent adept at identifying mobilizing structures critical to the insurgent. 
A successful amnesty program should have several components. First, it needs to 
take advantage of existing political opportunities. In the case of the Sunni insurgency, 
this amnesty program offered increased power and prestige to tribes who saw their 
influence diminished under a new Iraqi regime. The program also offered a political 
alternative to tribes disenchanted with AQI’s restrictions on participating in the Iraqi 
political process. Such an amnesty program should examine existing political conditions 
and leverage or exacerbate key political differences or sources of contention between the 
insurgent group and the populace. 
An amnesty program should also seek to deprive an insurgent group of critical 
mobilizing structures. In the case of the Sunni insurgency, this critical mobilizing 
structure was the Sunni tribal system. Due to the tribes’ perceived loss in status and 
power, money and weaponry were effective incentives to cause the tribes to abandon the 
insurgency. A successful program should identify these structures and determine 
appropriate incentives based upon what these mobilizing structures value. 
Such a program is not without its limitations, however. A carefully conceived 
amnesty program needs to be sustainable, if insurgents perceive an amnesty program is 
transitory or not sufficiently supported by the state, the program will be ineffective. The 
long-term ramifications of an amnesty program also have to be taken into account. How 
will those seeking amnesty be integrated into society? How will the amnesty program be 
phased out with no recidivism among those who sought amnesty? An effective method is 
to transition the former insurgents to state-funded employment. This method ties the 
livelihood of the insurgent to that of the state and builds loyalty to the state. These factors 
must be taken into account when planning an amnesty program so such a program 
appears attractive and credible to insurgents.  
 130
D. POTENTIAL POLICY APPLICATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF 
INDONESIA TO COUNTER JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 
Based on the empirical research and social movement theory literature, this thesis 
offers potential courses of action the Government of Indonesia may take against the JI 
movement. This thesis examines JI since it is an active insurgency and the empirical 
evidence indicates that the GOI has developed an incomplete strategy with which to 
defeat it. This offers the authors an illustrative opportunity to postulate potential 
strategies for a current insurgency based on this thesis’s research. 
In JI’s case, an attempt was made to research and demonstrate the synergistic 
relationship that is an outcome of the insurgency SMO nexus. If this relationship creates 
more resources for the insurgency, then it follows logically that those actions to disrupt 
the relationship decreases the resources available to the insurgency. This offers several 
courses of action, which are examined in the context of the JI movement: (1) build a 
competing SMO that may draw members and resources away from the insurgencies 
SMO; (2) attempt to co-opt433 the insurgents SMO so it is more in line with the state’s 
objectives and contributes less resources to the insurgency; (3) disrupt the relationship 
between the SMO and the insurgency either through limiting communication, or creating 
crises of trust and legitimacy between the two organizations; (4) attempt to co-opt the 
insurgency while repressing the SMO and; (5) attempt to co-opt the SMO while 
repressing the insurgency. Additionally, this thesis highlights the absence of a state 
strategy to decrease the political opportunities available to JI that has allowed greater 
political space within which it has used its sympathetic SMO. Thus, it logically follows 
that whichever course or course of action the state uses, it would be beneficial to the state 
if it could decrease the political opportunities available to JI. 
The option of building a competing SMO was pursued by the TNI during the 
Darul Islam insurgency and was very effective. The pursuit of this strategy to defeat JI 
would require a layered application as the state would need to create legitimate village 
                                                 
433 The term co-opt is an accepted abbreviation of Cooptation, which is defined as the tactic of 
neutralizing or winning over a minority by assimilating them into the established group or culture. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Co-opt. 
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level SMOs to counter the various MMI and JAT affiliated groups gaining influence with 
local governments and populations in the various towns and villages where MMI/JAT has 
gained influence. The challenge of creating a legitimate SMO that could represent 
Indonesians that desire a more Islamic state but will not advocate violence against the 
state or prejudice and violence against non-Muslims will be challenging but potentially 
beneficial. This course of action would require the recruitment of leaders with strong 
religious credentials who possessed the ability to stand up to the more radical members of 
the Islamic faith and could articulate the fact that commitment to Islam does not require 
violence against followers of a different faith. This group would have to demonstrate 
some independence from the state as well. 
The option of appropriating existing SMOs, in this case, MMI and JAT, which the 
insurgency uses, will be very challenging for Indonesia. In this case, the leadership of 
MMI and JAT are simultaneously members of JI. Both of these SMOs were created by JI 
leaders so the cleavage of the SMOs away from the insurgency would be very difficult. 
The only course of action that may offer some potential for success is to attempt to co-opt 
individual SMO leaders in an attempt to convince them that politics offer them a great 
potential to achieve their goals over the use of violence. This strategy is very hazardous 
as it may convince the individual SMO leaders that they need to maintain their 
connection to the insurgency to maintain the state’s incentives to continue offering 
resources to the SMO leaders. In a case where the insurgency and SMO leaders are not 
one and the same, this option may offer more opportunities for success. 
The third option apparent from SMT literature is that of disrupting the SMO-
insurgency relationship. Once again, the actions taken by the TNI in the DI case study 
offer an example of success. The TNI took control of the road and train networks and 
limited the ability of the DI civil administration (their SMO acting as a local government) 
and the insurgency leadership. Obviously, this strategy is far more difficult in the modern 
age of multiple means of electronic communications. A second potential method to 
disrupt the relationship of the insurgency and the SMO is by attacking the insurgent’s 
legitimacy, thus, potentially encouraging the SMO to distance itself from the insurgency. 
This would be difficult in the JI case as MMI and JAT are so closely tied to JI’s ideology. 
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An attack against JI’s ideology would probably not encourage MMI and JAT to distance 
itself from JI at this point. However, as the organizations develop, then a newer 
generation of MMI and JAT leaders may be more willing to abandon JI relationships to 
protect their own legitimacy. 
The fourth option available to the state would be an attempt to co-opt the 
insurgency while pressuring the SMO through increased repression and limiting its 
available POS. This would require some mechanism of outreach from the state to the 
insurgency without using the insurgency’s sympathetic SMO. This would be challenging 
but not insurmountable. There is also the potential that co-opting the insurgency may 
deliver to it some legitimacy that would enhance its strength. However, this strategy 
offers the potential to disrupt the relationship between the insurgency and the SMO and 
to convince the insurgency that violence is not necessary to achieve its political goals. 
The final option that appears available in the JI case is that of co-opting the SMO 
while repressing the insurgency. This is a strategy that the GOI has attempted through its 
continued police actions that focus on JIs operational cells while simultaneously allowing 
MMI to influence local governments and JAT to conduct public sermons and outreach. 
However, there is no evidence that the GOI is actually following a strategy. It appears 
that the GOI is allowing events to unfold without a defining starting concept. This limits 
the GOI from reaping any advantages from this strategy. If the GOI were to create a 
strategy that incorporated the co-opting of SMOs, then they must develop some type of 
formalized relationship with MMI and JAT in which the GOI could influence their 
actions. Presently, they seem to have no such formal relationship. 
Whichever option or combination of options the GOI uses, it should be within a 
strategy that also seeks to limit the political opportunities available to JI. Political 
opportunities generally grow for insurgents in an environment of political instability434 
and this has certainly been the case for JI in Indonesia. This instability combined with an 
“over-sensitivity” by politicians to the potential popular appeal of the Islamist agenda 
                                                 
434 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 40-43.  
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continue to allow JI to enjoy broad political opportunities.435 Indonesia’s maturing 
democracy combined with leadership on the part of the national civilian leadership will 
reverse the trends and begin to collapse the political opportunities available to JI. 
E. APPLICATION TO CA AND OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
The obvious lesson from this thesis is that some element of the COIN forces must 
be able to analyze the methods the insurgents are using to mobilize the population and 
must be able to examine the political opportunity structure, strategic frames, and 
mobilizing structure of the insurgency-SMO nexus. In the U.S. Army, this responsibility 
would logically fall to the Civil Affairs branch.436 All of the U.S. Army’s Special 
Operations Forces437 have experience and the doctrinal mandate to organize and train 
indigenous military forces but have limited doctrinal foundation for creating non-military 
organizations such as a social movement organization.438 The absence of doctrine does 
not mean absence of need, however. As this thesis has argued, an insurgency is a war 
amongst the population. A viable and efficient method, in some cases, to mobilize the 
population for the state or the insurgent, is through the formation or co-optation of social 
movement organizations. Logically, this follows that some elements of the U.S. DoD 
should have the capacity to organize or engage SMOs. The most likely to do so, based on 
experience, ability, and mission, is the U.S. Army SOF, and specifically, U.S. Army Civil 
Affairs. 
                                                 
435 Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 2007) 92-95. 
436 According to the Department of Defense JP 3-57 Civil Military Operations, the definition of civil-
military affairs is, “The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations 
between military forces, government and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the 
civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, 
to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance 
by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national 
government.” Joint Staff, Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, July 8, 2008, GL-6. 
437 This includes U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. 
438 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006). 
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F. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, the authors have explored the benefits that an insurgency can gain 
through its relationship with an SMO. Further, this thesis has sought to prove that the 
state is presented with a potential strategy in which the state can limit the resources 
available to an insurgency by limiting the resources that the SMO transfers to the 
insurgency. This thesis has also presented a valuable method the counterinsurgent can use 
to analyze the insurgency–SMO nexus. The concept of mobilization as well as de-
mobilization and counter-mobilization offer the state a more efficient lens with which to 
evaluate potential strategies. In addition, the use of social movement theory and the three 
elements, political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and strategic frames, 
also offer the state potentially valuable methods with which to evaluate the insurgency-
SMO nexus and the state’s own COIN strategies. In general, many COIN strategies focus 
on the mobilizing structures through attempts to counter the insurgency network by 
killing or capturing members. On the other hand, the COIN strategy may focus on the 
strategic frames by using a combination of civic actions focused on addressing popular 
grievances and an information campaign to highlight the state’s actions to address those 
grievances. These two elements are essential to COIN success but social movement 
theory would show that the third element of political opportunities must be evaluated and 
addressed just as the other two elements have been. POS is just as essential to a 
successful COIN campaign as are MS and SF. 
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